A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) as Standardized in PKCS #1 v2.0
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An adaptive chosen ciphertext attack against PKCS #1 v2.0 RSA OAEP encryption is described. It recovers the plaintext - not the private key - from a given ciphertext in a little over log2 n queries of an oracle implementing the algorithm, where n is the RSA modulus. The high likelihood of implementations being susceptible to this attack is explained as well as the practicality of the attack. Improvements to the algorithm to defend against the attack are discussed.
Keywordschosen ciphertext attack RSA OAEP PKCS
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