AGVI — Automatic Generation, Verification, and Implementation of Security Protocols

  • Dawn Song
  • Adrian Perrig
  • Doantam Phan
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2102)

Abstract

As new Internet applications emerge, new security protocols and systems need to be designed and implemented. Unfortunately the current protocol design and implementation process is often ad-hoc and error prone. To solve this problem, we have designed and implemented a toolkit AGVI, Automatic Generation, Verification, and Implementation of Security Protocols. With AGVI, the protocol designer inputs the system specification (such as cryptographic key setup) and security requirements. AGVI will then automatically find the near-optimal protocols for the specific application, proves the correctness of the protocols and implement the protocols in Java. Our experiments have successfully generated new and even simpler protocols than the ones documented in the literature.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dawn Song
    • 1
  • Adrian Perrig
    • 1
  • Doantam Phan
    • 1
  1. 1.University of CaliforniaBerkeley

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