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Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Based on RSA

  • Philip MacKenzie
  • Sarvar Patel
  • Ram Swaminathan
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1976)

Abstract

There have been many proposals in recent years for password-authenticated key exchange protocols.Man y of these have been shown to be insecure, and the only ones that seemed likely to be proven secure (against active adversaries who may attempt to perform off-line dictionary attacks against the password) were based on the Diffie-Hellman problem. In fact, some protocols based on Diffie-Hellman have been recently proven secure in the random-oracle model. We examine how to design a provably-secure password-authenticated key exchange protocol based on RSA.We first look at the OKE and protected-OKE protocols (both RSA-based) and show that they are insecure.Then we show how to modify the OKE protocol to obtain a password-authenticated key exchange protocol that can be proven secure (in the random oracle model). The resulting protocol is very practical; in fact the basic protocol requires about the same amount of computation as the Diffie-Hellman-based protocols or the well-known ssh protocol.

Keywords

Authentication Protocol Random Oracle Dictionary Attack User Instance Perfect Forward Secrecy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Philip MacKenzie
    • 1
  • Sarvar Patel
    • 1
  • Ram Swaminathan
    • 2
  1. 1.Bell LaboratoriesLucent TechnologiesUSA
  2. 2.Hewlett-Packard Research LaboratoriesUSA

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