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Compiling and Verifying Security Protocols

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Logic for Programming and Automated Reasoning (LPAR 2000)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence ((LNAI,volume 1955))

Abstract

We propose a direct and fully automated translation from standard security protocol descriptions to rewrite rules. This compilation defines non-ambiguous operational semantics for protocols and intruder behavior: they are rewrite systems executed by applying a variant of acnarrowing. The rewrite rules are processed by the theorem-prover daTac. Multiple instances of a protocol can be run simultaneously as well as a model of the intruder (among several possible). The existence of flaws in the protocol is revealed by the derivation of an inconsistency. Our implementation of the compiler CASRUL, together with the prover daTac, permitted us to derive security flaws in many classical cryptographic protocols.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Campus Scientifique, LORIA - INRIA Lorraine, Vandœuvre-lès, B.P. 239, 54506, Nancy Cedex, France

    Florent Jacquemard & Michaël Rusinowitch

  2. Campus Scientifique, LORIA - Universitè Nancy 2, Vandœuvre-lès, B.P. 239, 54506, Nancy Cedex, France

    Laurent Vigneron

Authors
  1. Florent Jacquemard
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  2. Michaël Rusinowitch
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  3. Laurent Vigneron
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. CNRS, Université de Paris 7, case 7012, 2 place Jussieu, 75251, Paris Cedex 05, France

    Michel Parigot

  2. Computer Science Department, University of Manchester, Oxford Rd, M13 9PL, Manchester, UK

    Andrei Voronkov

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© 2000 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Jacquemard, F., Rusinowitch, M., Vigneron, L. (2000). Compiling and Verifying Security Protocols. In: Parigot, M., Voronkov, A. (eds) Logic for Programming and Automated Reasoning. LPAR 2000. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence(), vol 1955. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44404-1_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44404-1_10

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-41285-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-44404-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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