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Representing Belief Revision through Default Theories

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Advances in Artificial Intelligence (IBERAMIA 2000, SBIA 2000)

Abstract

We examine the representations of epistemic states and their revision processes (RP) through default theories (DTs). Using a sphere-based semantics for DTs we characterize a RP as a sequence of consistent expansions without using contractions. We show that DTs provide an unifying framework for revision in both semantical and syntactical-based approaches as well as in coherent and foundation approaches. Motivated by Nebel’s work, we propose to extend the use of default theories in two directions: (i) using supernormal default theories to represent semantical classified revision processes; (ii) using general default theories and some variants of Reiter’s default logics to represent foundation classified revision processes. We define revision operators, which can be viewed as a revision on the epistemic states, represented by a DT T, by a sentence α. Basically, they are defined via some operations on the class of the extensions of a default theory T’ obtained from T and α.

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© 2000 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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da Silva, J.C.P., Veloso, S.R.M. (2000). Representing Belief Revision through Default Theories. In: Monard, M.C., Sichman, J.S. (eds) Advances in Artificial Intelligence. IBERAMIA SBIA 2000 2000. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 1952. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44399-1_24

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44399-1_24

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-41276-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-44399-5

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