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International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques

EUROCRYPT 2003: Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT 2003 pp 68–86Cite as

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On the Limitations of Universally Composable Two-Party Computation without Set-up Assumptions

On the Limitations of Universally Composable Two-Party Computation without Set-up Assumptions

  • Ran Canetti5,
  • Eyal Kushilevitz6 &
  • Yehuda Lindell5 
  • Conference paper
  • First Online: 01 January 2003
  • 3696 Accesses

  • 64 Citations

  • 1 Altmetric

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS,volume 2656)

Abstract

The recently proposed universally composable (UC) security framework, for analyzing security of cryptographic protocols, provides very strong security guarantees. In particular, a protocol proven secure in this framework is guaranteed to maintain its security even when deployed in arbitrary multi-party, multi-protocol, multi-execution environments.

Protocols for securely carrying out essentially any cryptographic task in a universally composable way exist, both in the case of an honest majority (in the plain model, i.e., without set-up assumptions) and in the case of no honest majority (in the common reference string model). However, in the plain model, little was known for the case of no honest majority and, in particular, for the important special case of two-party protocols.

We study the feasibility of universally composable two-party function evaluation in the plain model. Our results show that very few functions can be computed in this model so as to provide the UC security guarantees. Specifically, for the case of deterministic functions, we provide a full characterization of the functions computable in this model. (Essentially, these are the functions that depend on at most one of the parties’ inputs, and furthermore are “efficiently invertible” in a sense defined within.) For the case of probabilistic functions, we show that the only functions computable in this model are those where one of the parties can essentially uniquely determine the joint output.

Keywords

  • Ideal Process
  • Ideal Functionality
  • Negligible Probability
  • Overwhelming Probability
  • Real Execution

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Part of this work was done while the author was a visitor at IBM T.J. Watson Research Center.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. IBM T.J.Watson Research, 19 Skyline Drive, Hawthorne, NY, 10532, USA

    Ran Canetti & Yehuda Lindell

  2. Computer Science Department, Technion, Haifa, 32000, Israel

    Eyal Kushilevitz

Authors
  1. Ran Canetti
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  2. Eyal Kushilevitz
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  3. Yehuda Lindell
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Department, Technion — Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, 32000, Israel

    Eli Biham

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© 2003 International Association for Cryptologic Research

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Canetti, R., Kushilevitz, E., Lindell, Y. (2003). On the Limitations of Universally Composable Two-Party Computation without Set-up Assumptions. In: Biham, E. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT 2003. EUROCRYPT 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2656. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-39200-9_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-39200-9_5

  • Published: 13 May 2003

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-14039-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-39200-2

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