Skip to main content

Advertisement

SpringerLink
Log in
Menu
Find a journal Publish with us
Search
Cart
Book cover

International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques

EUROCRYPT 2003: Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT 2003 pp 51–67Cite as

  1. Home
  2. Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT 2003
  3. Conference paper
Two-Threshold Broadcast and Detectable Multi-party Computation

Two-Threshold Broadcast and Detectable Multi-party Computation

  • Matthias Fitzi5,
  • Martin Hirt6,
  • Thomas Holenstein6 &
  • …
  • Jürg Wullschleger6 
  • Conference paper
  • First Online: 01 January 2003
  • 3448 Accesses

  • 18 Citations

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS,volume 2656)

Abstract

Classical distributed protocols like broadcast or multi-party computation provide security as long as the number of malicious players f is bounded by some given threshold t, i.e., f ≤ t. If f exceeds t then these protocols are completely insecure.

We relax this binary concept to the notion of two-threshold security: Such protocols guarantee full security as long as f ≤ t for some small threshold t, and still provide some degraded security when t < f ≤ T for a larger threshold T. In particular, we propose the following problems.

  • Broadcast withExtendedValidity: Standard broadcast is achieved when f ≤ t. When t < f ≤ T, then either broadcast is achieved, or every player learns that there are too many faults. Furthermore, when the sender is honest, then broadcast is always achieved.

  • Broadcast withExtendedConsistency: Standard broadcast is achieved when f ≤ t. When t < f ≤ T, then either broadcast is achieved, or every player learns that there are too many faults. Furthermore, the players agree on whether or not broadcast is achieved.

  • DetectableMulti-PartyComputation: Secure computation is achieved when f ≤ t. When t < f ≤ T, then either the computation is secure, or all players detect that there are too many faults and abort. The above protocols for n players exist if and only if t = 0 or t+2T < n.

Keywords

  • Broadcast Channel
  • Broadcast Protocol
  • Byzantine Agreement
  • General Adversary
  • Adversary Structure

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Partially supported by the Packard Foundation.

Supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation, project no. 2000-066716.01/1.

Download conference paper PDF

References

  1. D. Beaver. Multiparty protocols tolerating half faulty processors. In CRYPTO’ 89, vol. 435 of LNCS, pp. 560–572. Springer-Verlag, 1989.

    Google Scholar 

  2. D. Beaver and S. Goldwasser. Multiparty computation with faulty majority. In Proc. 30th FOCS, pp. 468–473. IEEE 1989.

    Google Scholar 

  3. P. Berman and J. Garay. Asymptotically optimal distributed consensus. In Proc. 16th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, vol. 372 of LNCS, pp. 80–94. Springer-Verlag, 1989.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  4. P. Berman, J. A. Garay, and K. J. Perry. Towards optimal distributed consensus. In Proc. 30th FOCS, pp. 410–415. IEEE, 1989.

    Google Scholar 

  5. M. Ben-Or, S. Goldwasser, and A. Wigderson. Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation. In Proc. 20th STOC, pp. 1–10. ACM, 1988.

    Google Scholar 

  6. B. Baum-Waidner, B. Pfitzmann, and M. Waidner. Unconditional Byzantine agreement with good majority. In Proc. 8th Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, vol. 480 of LNCS, pp. 285–295. Springer-Verlag, 1991.

    Google Scholar 

  7. D. Chaum, C. Crépeau, and I. Damgård. Multiparty unconditionally secure protocols. In Proc. 20th STOC, pp. 11–19. ACM, 1988.

    Google Scholar 

  8. R. Cramer, I. Damgård, S. Dziembowski, M. Hirt, and T. Rabin. Efficient multiparty computations secure against an adaptive adversary. In EUROCRYPT’ 99, vol. 1592 of LNCS, pp. 311–326. Springer-Verlag, 1999.

    Google Scholar 

  9. D. Dolev, C. Dwork, O. Waarts, and M. Yung. Perfectly secure message transmission. Journal of the ACM, 40(1):17–47, 1993.

    CrossRef  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  10. D. Dolev, M. J. Fischer, R. Fowler, N. A. Lynch, and H. R. Strong. An efficient algorithm for Byzantine agreement without authentication. Information and Control, 52(3):257–274, 1982.

    CrossRef  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  11. D. Dolev and H. R. Strong. Polynomial algorithms for multiple processor agreement. In Proc. 14th STOC, pp. 401–407. ACM, 1982.

    Google Scholar 

  12. M. Fitzi, D. Gottesman, M. Hirt, T. Holenstein, and A. Smith. Byzantine agreement secure against faulty majorities from scratch. In Proc. 21st PODC, ACM, 2002.

    Google Scholar 

  13. M. Fitzi, N. Gisin, and U. Maurer. Quantum solution to the Byzantine agreement problem. Physical Review Letters, 87(21), 2001.

    Google Scholar 

  14. M. Fitzi, N. Gisin, U. Maurer, and O. von Rotz. Unconditional Byzantine agreement and multi-party computation secure against dishonest minorities from scratch. In EUROCRYPT 2002, vol. 2332 of LNCS. Springer-Verlag, 2002.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  15. M. J. Fischer, N. A. Lynch, and M. Merritt. Easy impossibility proofs for distributed consensus problems. Distributed Computing, 1:26–39, 1986.

    CrossRef  MATH  Google Scholar 

  16. P. Feldman and S. Micali. An optimal probabilistic protocol for synchronous Byzantine agreement. SIAM Journal on Computing, 26(4):873–933, 1997.

    CrossRef  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  17. Matthias Fitzi and Ueli Maurer. Efficient Byzantine agreement secure against general adversaries. In Proc. 12th DISC, vol. 1499 of LNCS, pp. 134–148. Springer-Verlag, 1998.

    Google Scholar 

  18. S. Goldwasser and Y. Lindell. Secure computation without agreement. In Proc. 16th DISC’02, vol. 2508 of LNCS, pp. 17–32. Springer-Verlag, 2002.

    Google Scholar 

  19. O. Goldreich, S. Micali, and A. Wigderson. How to play any mental game. In Proc. 19th STOC, pp. 218–229, ACM, 1987.

    Google Scholar 

  20. O. Goldreich. Secure multi-party computation, working draft, version 1.3, June 2001.

    Google Scholar 

  21. Martin Hirt and Ueli Maurer. Complete characterization of adversaries tolerable in secure multi-party computation. In Proc. 16th PODC, pp. 25–34. ACM 1997. Full version in Journal of Cryptology, 13(1):31–60, 2000.

    Google Scholar 

  22. T. Holenstein. Hybrid broadcast protocols. Master’s Thesis, ETH Zurich, October 2001.

    Google Scholar 

  23. A. Karlin and A. C. Yao. Manuscript, 1984.

    Google Scholar 

  24. L. Lamport. The weak Byzantine generals problem. Journal of the ACM, 30(3):668–676, 1983.

    CrossRef  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  25. L. Lamport, R. Shostak, and M. Pease. The Byzantine generals problem. Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems, 4(3):382–401. ACM, 1982.

    CrossRef  MATH  Google Scholar 

  26. B. Pfitzmann and M. Waidner. Information-theoretic pseudosignatures and Byzantine agreement for t ≥ n/3. Research Report RZ 2882 (#90830), IBM Research, 1996.

    Google Scholar 

  27. T. Rabin and M. Ben-Or. Verifiable secret sharing and multiparty protocols with honest majority. In Proc. 21st STOC, pp. 73–85. ACM, 1989.

    Google Scholar 

  28. R. Turpin and B. A. Coan. Extending binary Byzantine Agreement to multivalued Byzantine Agreement. Information Processing Letters, 18(2):73–76, 1984.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  29. N. H. Vaidya and D. K. Pradhan. Degradable agreement in the presence of Byzantine faults. In Proc. 13th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, pp. 237–245. IEEE, 1993.

    Google Scholar 

  30. A. C. Yao. Protocols for secure computations. In Proc. 23rd FOCS, pp. 160–164. IEEE, 1982.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of California, Davis, USA

    Matthias Fitzi

  2. ETH Zurich, Switzerland

    Martin Hirt, Thomas Holenstein & Jürg Wullschleger

Authors
  1. Matthias Fitzi
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Martin Hirt
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Thomas Holenstein
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  4. Jürg Wullschleger
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Department, Technion — Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, 32000, Israel

    Eli Biham

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

Copyright information

© 2003 International Association for Cryptologic Research

About this paper

Cite this paper

Fitzi, M., Hirt, M., Holenstein, T., Wullschleger, J. (2003). Two-Threshold Broadcast and Detectable Multi-party Computation. In: Biham, E. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT 2003. EUROCRYPT 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2656. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-39200-9_4

Download citation

  • .RIS
  • .ENW
  • .BIB
  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-39200-9_4

  • Published: 13 May 2003

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-14039-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-39200-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Share this paper

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

Search

Navigation

  • Find a journal
  • Publish with us

Discover content

  • Journals A-Z
  • Books A-Z

Publish with us

  • Publish your research
  • Open access publishing

Products and services

  • Our products
  • Librarians
  • Societies
  • Partners and advertisers

Our imprints

  • Springer
  • Nature Portfolio
  • BMC
  • Palgrave Macmillan
  • Apress
  • Your US state privacy rights
  • Accessibility statement
  • Terms and conditions
  • Privacy policy
  • Help and support

167.114.118.210

Not affiliated

Springer Nature

© 2023 Springer Nature