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International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques

EUROCRYPT 2003: Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT 2003 pp 177–194Cite as

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Strengthening Zero-Knowledge Protocols Using Signatures

Strengthening Zero-Knowledge Protocols Using Signatures

  • Juan A. Garay5,
  • Philip MacKenzie5 &
  • Ke Yang6 
  • Conference paper
  • First Online: 01 January 2003
  • 4008 Accesses

  • 58 Citations

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS,volume 2656)

Abstract

Recently there has been an interest in zero-knowledge protocols with stronger properties, such as concurrency, unbounded simulation soundness, non-malleability, and universal composability. In this paper, we show a novel technique to convert a large class of existing honest-verifier zero-knowledge protocols into ones with these stronger properties in the common reference string model. More precisely, our technique utilizes a signature scheme existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks, and transforms any Σ-protocol (which is honest-verifier zero-knowledge) into an unbounded simulation sound concurrent zero-knowledge protocol. We also introduce Ω-protocols, a variant of Σ-protocols for which our technique further achieves the properties of non-malleability and/or universal composability.

In addition to its conceptual simplicity, a main advantage of this new technique over previous ones is that it avoids the Cook-Levin theorem, which tends to be rather inefficient. Indeed, our technique allows for very efficient instantiation based on the security of some efficient signature schemes and standard number-theoretic assumptions. For instance, one instantiation of our technique yields a universally composable zero-knowledge protocol under the Strong RSA assumption, incurring an overhead of a small constant number of exponentiations, plus the generation of two signatures.

Keywords

  • Signature Scheme
  • Commitment Scheme
  • Common Input
  • Common Reference String
  • Universal Composability Framework

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Bell Labs — Lucent Technologies, 600 Mountain Ave., Murray Hill, NJ, 07974, USA

    Juan A. Garay & Philip MacKenzie

  2. Computer Science Dept., Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, 15213, USA

    Ke Yang

Authors
  1. Juan A. Garay
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  2. Philip MacKenzie
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  3. Ke Yang
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Department, Technion — Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, 32000, Israel

    Eli Biham

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© 2003 International Association for Cryptologic Research

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Cite this paper

Garay, J.A., MacKenzie, P., Yang, K. (2003). Strengthening Zero-Knowledge Protocols Using Signatures. In: Biham, E. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT 2003. EUROCRYPT 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2656. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-39200-9_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-39200-9_11

  • Published: 13 May 2003

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-14039-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-39200-2

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