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A Simple Language for Real-Time Cryptographic Protocol Analysis

  • Roberto Gorrieri
  • Enrico Locatelli
  • Fabio Martinelli
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2618)

Abstract

A real-time process algebra, enhanced with specific constructs for handling cryptographic primitives, is proposed to model cryptographic protocols in a simple way.We show that some security properties, such as authentication and secrecy, can be re-formulated in this timed setting. Moreover, we show that they can be seen as suitable instances of a general information flow-like scheme, called tGN DC, parametric w.r.t. the observational semantics of interest.We show that, when considering timed trace semantics, there exists a most powerful hostile environment (or enemy) that can try to compromise the protocol. Moreover, we hint some compositionality results.

Keywords

Operational Semantic Hostile Environment Security Property Cryptographic Protocol Public Channel 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Roberto Gorrieri
    • 1
  • Enrico Locatelli
    • 1
  • Fabio Martinelli
    • 2
  1. 1.Dipartimento di Scienze dell’InformazioneUniversità di BolognaItaly
  2. 2.Istituto di Informatica e Telematica C.N.R.PisaItaly

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