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A Tail-Recursive Semantics for Stack Inspections

  • John Clements
  • Matthias Felleisen
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2618)

Abstract

Security folklore holds that a security mechanism based on stack inspection is incompatible with a global tail call optimization policy. An implementation of such a language may have to allocate memory for a source-code tail call, and a program that uses only tail calls (and no other memory-allocating construct) may nevertheless exhaust the available memory. In this paper, we prove this widely held belief wrong. We exhibit an abstract machine for a language with security stack inspection whose space consumption function is equivalent to that of the canonical tail call optimizing abstract machine. Our machine is surprisingly simple and suggests that tail-calls are as easy to implement in a security setting as they are in a conventional one.

Keywords

Garbage Collection Reduction Rule Source Language Abstract Machine Runtime System 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • John Clements
    • 1
  • Matthias Felleisen
    • 1
  1. 1.Northeastern UniversityBostonMassachusetts

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