A Simple Power-Analysis (SPA) Attack on Implementations of the AES Key Expansion

  • Stefan Mangard
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/3-540-36552-4_24

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2587)
Cite this paper as:
Mangard S. (2003) A Simple Power-Analysis (SPA) Attack on Implementations of the AES Key Expansion. In: Lee P.J., Lim C.H. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology — ICISC 2002. ICISC 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2587. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

This article presents a simple power-analysis (SPA) attack on implementations of the AES key expansion. The attack reveals the secret key of AES software implementations on smart cards by exploiting the fact that the power consumption of most smart-card processors leaks information during the AES key expansion. The presented attack efficiently utilizes this information leakage to substantially reduce the key space that needs to be considered in a brute-force search for the secret key. The details of the attack are described on the basis of smart cards that leak the Hamming weight of intermediate results occurring during the AES key expansion.

Keywords

Smart Cards Power Analysis SPA AES Key Expansion Key Scheduling 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stefan Mangard
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute for Applied Information Processing and CommunicationsGraz University of TechnologyGrazAustria

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