A Format-Independent Architecture for Run-Time Integrity Checking of Executable Code

  • Luigi Catuogno
  • Ivan Visconti
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2576)


A robust architecture against network intrusions plays a main role for information security and service reliability. An intruder that obtains an unauthorized access to a remote system could read restricted information or hide this access for future and eventually more dangerous actions. Temporary intrusions can become permanent (i.e., resistant to reboots) if malicious code is installed in a system not adequately protected. In this paper we propose an infrastructure for the run-time integrity checking of executable code. Our approach is general as the specification of our infrastructure includes support for every file format. Moreover we also present our implementation that supports run-time integrity checking for ELF and shell script files. Experimental results show that our solution is a practical and effective protection for workstations connected to the Internet offering services to local and remote users.


Access Control Policy Malicious Code Shared Object Executable Code Shell Script 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Luigi Catuogno
    • 1
  • Ivan Visconti
    • 1
  1. 1.Dipartimento di Informatica ed ApplicazioniUniversità di SalernoBaronissi (SA)Italy

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