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Invention vs. Discovery A Critical Discussion

  • Carlotta Piscopo
  • Mauro Birattari
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2534)

Abstract

The paper proposes an epistemological analysis of the dichotomy discovery/invention. In particular, we argue in favor of the idea that science does not discover facts by induction but rather invents theories that are then checked against experience.

Keywords

Newtonian Mechanic Inventionist Position Modus Tollens Theory Ques Computational Exploration 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Carlotta Piscopo
    • 1
  • Mauro Birattari
    • 1
  1. 1.IRIDIAUniversité Libre de BruxellesBrusselsBelgium

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