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The Risks of Compromising Secret Information

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Information and Communications Security (ICICS 2002)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2513))

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Abstract

This paper presents a taxonomy of known-key attacks on athenticated key agreement protocols, which is based on the adversaries’ roles and objectives. The taxonomy is illustrated using new attacks on the Just-Vaudenay and Yacobi protocol. The taxonomy is used to discuss countermeasures and protocol analysis methods against known-key attacks.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. KISA(Korea Information Security Agency), 78, Garak-Dong, Songpa-Gu, Seoul, 138-803, Korea

    Kyungah Shim

Authors
  1. Kyungah Shim
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Labs for Information Technology, 21 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Singapore, 119613

    Robert Deng , Feng Bao  & Jianying Zhou ,  & 

  2. Engineering Research Center for Information Security Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, P.O. Box 8718, Beijing, 100080, China

    Sihan Qing

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© 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Shim, K. (2002). The Risks of Compromising Secret Information. In: Deng, R., Bao, F., Zhou, J., Qing, S. (eds) Information and Communications Security. ICICS 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2513. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36159-6_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36159-6_11

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-00164-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-36159-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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