The National Level

  • Michel Richard
  • Bernard Chartier


International Atomic Energy Agency Security Council Nuclear Weapon Mass Destruction Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
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  1. 1.
    Cooley, J. (1998): International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Director, Department of Safeguards, Division Concept and Planning: “The Programme to strengthen the Effectiveness and Improve the Efficiency of Safeguards”, International Seminar on the 1998 preparatory Committee for the 2000 NPT Review Conference, ANNECY, France, 27 02–01 03 1998.Google Scholar
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    Remarks: At the time the IAEA was created in 1956, States were very reluctant to accept safeguards on their civilian fissile materials. Only very light verification dispositions were accepted by States. Progressively, the narrow scope of verification as contained in safeguards agreement IAEA/INFCIRC/26 (1961), were slightly strengthened during the sixties as IAEA/INFIRC/66/rev.2 agreements (1968). This agreement remains the one still ruling the nuclear verification of the IAEA in the three non-parties to the NPT, Israel, India and Pakistan.Google Scholar
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    Pierre Goldschmidt, P., op.cit. “The principle of international verification of States’ commitments to abide by the terms of agreements and not to engage in violations thereof is a post-Second World War novelty. The initial call for international verification can be traced to increasing awareness of the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy use and the dangers inherent in its misuse, as witnessed by Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As more and more States started to develop nuclear capability, the fear was that, unless strictly monitored, international nuclear trade could lead to horizontal proliferation of nuclear weaponsGoogle Scholar
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    National Technical Means (NTM) comprise all the monitoring and surveillance of a country of its own.Google Scholar
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    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), United Nations Organisation based in Vienna, in charge of Non Proliferation Treaty Safeguards verification.Google Scholar
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    Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), United Nations Organisation based in The Hague, in charge of the implementation of the Chemical Weapon Convention (1992) which aims at the elimination of Chemical Weapons.Google Scholar
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    Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) is the organisation based in Vienna which will responsible for the implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996) when it will enter into force.Google Scholar
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    United Nation Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), former United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) is the organisation based in New York, United Nations, which is responsible for the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) for disarmament of Iraq and the elimination of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction excepted nuclear.Google Scholar
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    Iraq Nuclear Verification Office (INVO), former IAEA Action Team is the organisation based at the IAEA, Vienna which depend of the IAEA Director General and is responsible for the nuclear disarmament of Iraq under UNSCR.Google Scholar
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    Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SQRT/Treaty of Moscow) has been signed on May 24th, 2002 and entered into forced on June 1st 2003 ( Scholar
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    The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a global effort that aims to stop shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide. Announced by President Bush on May 31, 2003, it stems from the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction issued in December. UN Security Council Resolution 1540, adopted unanimously by the Security Council, called on all States to take cooperative action to prevent trafficking in WMD. The PSI is a positive way to take such cooperative action (source: U.S. Department of States, The Proliferation Security Initiative, Bureau of Non Proliferation, Washington, DC, May 26, 2005, Scholar
  19. 19.
    As examples of bilateral instruments including verification disposition: Partial Test Ban Treaty and Threshold Test Ban Treaty, START I and II, ABACC organisation. Of multilateral instrument: the Open Sky Treaty, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and of international instruments as the Non-Proliferation Treaty. and the IAEA safeguards, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the CTBT Preparatory Commission., Export Control Groups, NSG, Zangger, Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime and the Biological Weapons Convention as the SQRT/ Treaty of Moscow does not provide for verification.Google Scholar
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    El Baradei M. (2004): Statements of IAEA DG, 21 June 2004, Carnegie International Non proliferation Conference: “Even a verification system making use of the authority under the additional protocol may not reliably detect low levels of clandestine activities such that conducted in Iran and Libya for many years, unless at the very least supported and supplemented by the sharing of actionable information from an effective system of export control as well as intelligence information where applicable available” ( Scholar
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    Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique (CEA).Google Scholar
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    Institut de Radioprotection et Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN)Google Scholar
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    So is the particular relationships and information exchange practices between NATO countries or NSG members.Google Scholar
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    For example information from IAEA board of Governors or from the future CTBTO International Monitoring System, International Data Centre information dissemination protocol.Google Scholar
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    As for NATO or the EU in the framework of European Security and Defence Policy.Google Scholar
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    The CTBT which provides for the use and the role of the National Technical Means in the verification process. (article IV, paragraphs 5 and 37). The IAEA safeguards verification system provides also for the use of “third party” information (see, 3).Google Scholar
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    International Atomic Energy Agency (2003): “Fifteenth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council Resolution 1051 (1996)” at 2003 422.pdf.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Berlin · Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michel Richard
    • 1
  • Bernard Chartier
    • 1
  1. 1.Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique; Direction des Applications Militaires Direction Matières SurveillanceEnvironnement Centre d’Île de France Bruyères, le ChâtelFrance

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