The Information Infrastructure of a Treaty Monitoring System

  • Nicholas Kyriakopoulos


The information infrastructures for arms control treaties are complex systems, because they are global and they generate outputs which may have major impact on the stability of the international security system. The information services they provide may make the difference between war and peace. Consequently, they need to be designed in such a manner that the quality of these services is commensurate with their importance. In this chapter we have identified the attributes of validity, sufficiency, integrity and timeliness to describe and measure the quality of the information services expected to be provided by a treaty information infrastructure. We have also presented the outline of a systematic approach for translating these service attributes into system design specifications. Essential to this approach is a properly designed infrastructure information management system. Without it one would never know whether or not the quality of services required by the treaty verification regime is, in effect, provided by the information infrastructure.


International Atomic Energy Agency Central Node Internet Protocol State Parti Information Infrastructure 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Berlin · Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nicholas Kyriakopoulos
    • 1
  1. 1.The George Washington UniversityWashington, DCUSA

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