The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique (CEA) or the French Authorities.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (1972): Document INFCIRC/153 (corrected), The Structure and Contents of Agreements between the Agency and States required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons also known as Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (also called “Full Scope Safeguards”).
Agreed Framework between the USA and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (1994): The agreed framework has been concluded between the North Korea and the USA in October 1994 and provided for the freeze of the operation or construction and eventually for the dismantling of all the north Korean critical nuclear facilities including plutonium production reactors, reprocessing plant and fuel fabrication facility.
United States of America President Eisenhower (1953): “Atom for Peace” speech to the United Nations General Assembly on the 8th December 1953 (http://www.iaea.or.at)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), (1956): Adoption of the IAEA statute on the 23rd October 1956.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), (1961): Document INFCIRC/26 (1961) The Agency Safeguards System first type of agreement covering, only reactors rated less than 100 Mwth then extended later to cover reactors of any sizes
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), (1968): Document INFIRC/66/rev.2 1968, The Agency’s safeguards system, as approved by the Board of Governors in 1965, and provisionally extended in 1966 and 1968, covers reactors of all size, reprocessing plants and fuel fabrication plants.
Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), (1968): Article II: Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), (1996): The Threshold Test Ban Treaty which prohibits nuclear explosion was the first agreement between USA and Soviet Union which was relying on mutual verification through on site-inspection.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): Zangger Committee guidelines and export control list has been published in IAEA document INFCIRC/209 (1974), Communications of Received from Member States Regarding the Export of Nuclear Material and of Certain Categories of Equipment and Other Material and revised in 2000 as IAEA/INFCIRC/209/Rev.2.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) guideline and export control list has been published in IAEA document INFCIRC/254 (1978): Communication Received from Certain Member States Regarding Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment or Technologies. Revised after the discovery of Iraq nuclear weapon programme to be strengthened and include dual use material, equipment and related technologies as a trigger list published as IAEA/INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Part 1 (1992) and a dual use items list has been published as INFCIRC/254/Rev.2/Part 1/Mod.1. (1996). Since, subsequent revisions has been made published as INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 1 (2005) and INFCIRC/254/Rev.6/Part 2 (2005).
Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), (1995): Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1995, the final document of the Conference has been published as NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I).
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (1996): The preamble of the CTBT states that “The States Parties to this Treaty (hereinafter referred to as “the States Parties”), Recognizing that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of ad vanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects”.
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and International Monitoring System (IMS): Information on the status of the CTBT and progress of the monitoring network are provided on the CTBTO PTS website: http://www.ctbto;org
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Entry into Force: The Entry into force of the CTBT requires the ratification of 44 states listed in Annex 2 of the Treaty. So far, 33 Annex 2 states have ratified but key states as United States, China, India, Israel, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea have not ratify it and do not seem willing to do it.
David Albright and Kimberley Kramer /ISIS (2004): “Fissile material: Stockpile still growing”, Bulletin of Atomic Scientist, November/December 2004. Russia has declared 50 tonnes of military plutonium and 500 tonnes of HEU, 200 tonnes of which have already been down blended. United States have declared 52.5 tonnes of plutonium and 170 tonnes of HEU 50 tonnes of which have already been down blended. Among the 50 and 52.5 tonnes of plutonium, United States and Russia have agreed to dispose 34 tonnes each through irradiation as MOX fuel in nuclear civil reactors. Great Britain has declared 4.4 tonnes of military plutonium in excess.
Marc Zwilling, Chef de Bataillon, Unite Française de Vérification (2005): This volume, Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE).
Jill Cooley (1998): “The Programme to strengthen the Effectiveness and Improve the Efficiency of Safeguards”, International Seminar on the 1998 preparatory Committee for the 2000 NPT Review Conference, ANNECY, France, 27 02–01 03 1998. “The discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in Iraq, the continuing difficulty in verifying the initial report of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) upon entry into force of their safeguards agreement and the decision of the South African Government to give up its nuclear weapons programme and join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) have all played a role in an ambitious effort by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Member States and the Secretariat to strengthen the safeguards system”.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), (1997): Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards. IAEA/INFCIRC/540 (corrected).
See ref. 10.
Pierre Goldschmidt (1999): “The IAEA system moves into the 21st century”, Supplement to the IAEA bulletin, Vol. 41, N. 4/December 1999, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Department of safeguards: For more information see http://www.iaea.org/
United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC ex UNSCOM/United Nations Special Commission) and: Iraq Nuclear Verification Office (INVO, ex Action Team)
United Nations Security Council (1991): “Plan for future Ongoing Monitoring and Verification (OMV) of Iraq’s compliance with paragraph 12 of part C of UNSCR Resolution 687 and with the requirements of paragraphs 3 and 5 of resolution 707” adopted under UNSCR 715 (1991). Cote S/22872/Rev.1
Iran Watch (February 2005): “IAEA reports and other documents 09-02-05 — Director General’s Report: Implementation of the NPT Safe guards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran (GOV/2005/67)”. http://www.iranwatch.org/international/index-iaea.html.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), (2005): “The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPMN)“ published as IAEA/INFCIRC/274/Rev.1, May 1980. The new strengthened Convention binds States parties to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage as well as transport and provide for expended cooperation between and among states regarding measures to locate and recover stolen and smuggled nuclear material, mitigate any radiological consequences of sabotage and prevent and combat related offences. The original CPPMN applied only to nuclear material in international transport” (IEAE press release 2005/03).
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA): see [1]
Conference on Disarmament (CD): “The question one could raise about the Conference on Disarmament stalled since eight years a sleeping beauty fallen asleep after a bright youth: NPT, CWC, CTBT, an old lady in the winter of its life or in irreversible coma? as pointed out by some, she has already been in this state in the past, so let’s be patient!”
United Nations Security Council (1991): UNSC in article 12 of Resolution 687 “Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above;.... to place all of its nuclear-weapons-usable materials under the exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to accept urgent on-site inspection and the destruction, removal or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items specified above; and to accept the plan discussed in paragraph 13 below for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of its compliance with these undertakings”.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), (1997): “Iraq’s lack of cooperation has required the IAEA to follow a protracted and painstaking process involving on site inspections, collection and analysis of procurement information and follow-up of other information provided by member state. The results of the IAEA’s investigation have over many years yielded a technically coherent picture of Iraq clandestine programme.”, GOV/INF/827 part. Two, para. 76, 19 November 1997.
IAEA: Iraq Nuclear Verification Office (INVO) / ex Action Team: A memorandum about talks between Iraq and Pakistan on possible supply of nuclear weapons related information was found in 1995 at Hussein Kamel’s Chicken Farm.
Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (1994): The Agreed Framework provides for the supply of heavy fuel and the construction of two non proliferating light water reactor under the KEDO supervision.
The six States involved in the six parties talks are North Korea, United States, Russia, China, South Korea, Japan.
IRAN WATCH-IAEA report, (2004): “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General”. GOV/2004/83, 15 November 2004.
Peter Slevin (2004): “Brazil shielding uranium facility. Nation seeks to keep its proprietary data from U.N. inspectors”, The Washington Post, April 4 2004.
Atomic Vapour Laser Isotope Separation (AVLIS) is a very advanced enrichment technique which was thought to be within the reach of and mastered by only few countries. Inspection in South Korea and Iran have demonstrated that this idea should be discarded
David E. Sanger and William J. Broad (2004): “South Koreans Say Secret Work Refined Uranium”, Washington Post, September 3, 2004
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), (2005): “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Arab Republic of Egypt”, Report by the Director General, document GOV/2005/9, 14 February 2005.
Pierre Goldschmidt (2004): Statements of M. Pierre Goldschmidt, Deputy Director General head of Safeguards Department of the IAEA, “The Proliferation Challenge of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle in Non-Nuclear Weapon States”, Institut Franais des Relations Internationales on,26 April 2004, Paris, France and “Strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: The Need For Broad Information and Access Rights”, Carnegie International Non Proliferation Conference on 22 June 2004, Washington, USA.
United States of America President G. W. Bush: Remarks by the President on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, National Defence University, Fort Lesley, 23 March 2004.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), (2005): Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report submitted to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency INFCIRC/640 (Date: 22 February 2005).
Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), (2004): Working paper submitted by France at the third Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 4 May 2004, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.22.
Roland Schenkel (2005): “Nuclear Security at the JRC” presentation of Roland Schenkel, European Commission Director General of the Joint Research Centre:. ESARDA Symposium: 10–12 May 2005, London.
Pierre Goldschmidt (2003): Statement of Pierre Goldschmidt, IAEA, Deputy Director General, head of Safeguards Department on 25 September 2003, Workshop on PCM&A best practices.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), (2005): “Introductory statement of IAEA Director General to the Board of Governors”, IAEA, Vienna, 14 June 2005.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2006 Springer Berlin · Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Richard, M. (2006). Beyond Iraq: The New Challenges to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Regime. In: Avenhaus, R., Kyriakopoulos, N., Richard, M., Stein, G. (eds) Verifying Treaty Compliance. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-33854-3_12
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-33854-3_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-33853-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-33854-3
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawLaw and Criminology (R0)