Abstract
Traditional logics are monotonic, i.e., adding new premises (axioms) will never invalidate previously inferred conclusions (theorems), or, equivalently, the set of conclusions non-decreases monotonically with the set of premises. Formally, a logic is monotonic if and only if it satisfies the condition that for any sets of premises S and S′,
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© 2006 Springer
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Doherty, P., Łukaszewicz, W., Skowron, A., Szałas, A. (2006). Non-Monotonic Reasoning. In: Knowledge Representation Techniques. Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing, vol 202. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-33519-6_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-33519-6_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-33518-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-33519-1
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