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Handbook on Optimal Growth 1 pp 443–477Cite as

Dynamic Games in Economics

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA

    Rabah Amir

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  1. CEREMADE, University of Paris IX Dauhine, Place du Marechal de Lattre de Tassigny, 75775, Paris Cedex 16, France

    Rose-Anne Dana

  2. CERMSEM, University of Paris 1 — Pantheon Sorbonne, 106-112 boulevard de l’Hopital, 75013, paris, France

    Cuong Le Van

  3. Department of Economics, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 14853, USA

    Tapan Mitra

  4. Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Yoshida-Honmachi, Sakyo-hu, Kyoto, 606-8501, Japan

    Kazuo Nishimura

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Amir, R. (2006). Dynamic Games in Economics. In: Dana, RA., Le Van, C., Mitra, T., Nishimura, K. (eds) Handbook on Optimal Growth 1. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-32310-4_14

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