Keywords
- Public Good
- Discount Factor
- Marginal Utility
- Public Investment
- Private Consumption
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Bohn, F. (2006). Corruption and Public Investment Under Political Instability: Theoretical Considerations. In: Broadman, H.G., Paas, T., Welfens, P.J. (eds) Economic Liberalization and Integration Policy. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-31183-1_11
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