The structure of the Nash equilibrium sets of standard 2-player games

  • Lin Zhou
Conference paper
Part of the Studies in Economic Theory book series (ECON.THEORY, volume 26)


In this paper I study a class of two-player games, in which both players’ action sets are [0, 1] and their payoff functions are continuous in joint actions and quasi-concave in own actions. I show that a no-improper-crossing condition is both necessary and sufficient for a finite subset A of [0, 1] × [0, 1] to be the set of Nash equilibria of such a game.

Keywords and Phrases

Nash equilibrium revealed preferences 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Lin Zhou
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Economics, WP Carey School of BusinessArizona State UniversityTempeUSA

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