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Zum Wahlparadoxon
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Zum Parteienverhalten
Lupia, A., 1992, Busy Voters, Agenda Control, and the Power of Information, American Political Science Review, 86, 390–403.
Mckelvey, R.D., Ordeshook, P.C., 1985, Sequential Elections with Limited Information, American Journal of Political Science, 29, 480–512.
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Schulz, N., Weimann, J., 1989, Competition of Newspapers and the Location of Political Parties, Public Choice, 63, 125–147.
Zum Verhalten von Interessengruppen
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Weimann, J. (2006). Delegations-probleme in ReprÄsentativen Demokratien. In: Weimann, J. (eds) Wirtschaftspolitik. Springer-Lehrbuch. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-28857-0_9
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