Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Ania, A.B., Trôger, T., and Wambach, A. (2002): An evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection, Games and Economic Behavior, 40, 153–184.
Aumann, R. and Brandenburger, A. (1995): Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium, Econometrica, 63(5), 1161–80.
Axelrod, R. (1984): The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books.
Bush, R. and Mosteller, F. (1955): Stochastic Models for Learning, Wiley.
Durieu, J. and Solal, P. (2002): Adaptive play with spatial sampling, Games and Economic Behavior, 43(2), 189–195.
Fudenberg, D. and Levine, D. (1998): The Theory of Learning in Games, MIT Press.
Harsanyi, J.C. (1967): Game with incomplete information played by “Bayesian” players, Management Science, 159–82, 320–34, 486–502.
Harsanyi, J.C. and Selten, R. (1988): A general theory of equilibrium selection in games, MIT Press.
Kalai, E. and Lehrer, E. (1993): Rational learning leads to Nash equilibrium, Econometrica, 61, 1019–1045.
Kandori, M., Mailath, G., and Rob, R. (1993): Learning, mutation and long run equilibria in games, Econometrica, 61, 27–56.
Kirman, A. (1995): Learning in oligopoly: theory, simulation and experimental evidence, in A. Kirman and M. Salmon (eds.), Learning and rationality in economics, Blackwell.
Laslier, J.-F., Topol, R., and Walliser, B. (2001): A behavioral learning process in games, Games and Economic Behavior, 37, 340–366.
Laslier, J.-F. and Walliser, B. (2004): A reinforcement learning process in extensive form games, International Journal of Game Theory, 33, 219–227.
Maynard Smith, J. (1982): Evolution and the Theory of Games, Cambridge University Press.
Monderer, D. and Shapley, L. (1966): Fictitious Play property for games with identical interests, Journal of Economic Theory, 68, 258–265.
Monderer, D. and Shapley, L. (1996): Potential games, Games and Economic Behavior, 14, 124–143.
Nash, J. (1951): Non cooperative games, Annals of Mathematics, 54, 289–93.
Nöldeke, G. and Samuelson, L. (1993): An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction, Games and Economic Behavior, 5, 425–454.
von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O. (1944): Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, Princeton University Press.
Robinson, J. (1951): An iterative method of solving a game, Annals of Mathematics, 54, 296–301.
Robson, A. and Vega-Redondo, F. (1996): Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching, Journal of Economic Theory, 70, 65–92.
Roth A. and Erev, I. (1995): Learning in extensive form games: experimental dataand simple dynamic models in the intermediate term, Games and Economic Behavior, 8, 164–212.
Rubinstein, A. (1994): Models of bounded rationality, MIT Press.
Samuelson, L. (1997): Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, MIT Press.
Skyrms, B. (1996): Evolution of the Social Contract, Cambridge University Press.
Vega-Redondo, F. (1996): Evolution, Games and Economic Behavior, Oxford University Press.
Vega-Redondo, F. (1997): The evolution of Walrasian behavior, Econometrica, 65, 375–84.
Walliser, B. (1998): A spectrum of equilibration processes in game theory, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 8, 67–87.
Weibull, J. (1995): Evolutionary Game Theory, MIT Press.
Young, H.P. (1993a): The evolution of conventions, Econometrica, 61:57–84.
Young, H.P. (1993b): An evolutionary model of bargaining, Journal of Economic Theory, 59, 145–168.
Young, H.P. (1998) Individual Strategy and Social Stucture, an Evolutionary Theory of Institutions, Princeton University Press.
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2006 Springer Berlin · Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
(2006). Game situations. In: Evolutionary Microeconomics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-28537-7_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-28537-7_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-28536-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-28537-3
eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsEconomics and Finance (R0)