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Adapted from a model developed for minimum time commitments required of US chairpersons by Carter and Lorsch (2004:78).
See Beatty (2003:7), who recommends that board members “devote time to serve effectively by not committing to other corporate and non-profit boards.”
In this regard, see Byham’s (1977) “targeted selection” interview method.
Ward (2003:63). See also Cray (1999).
See Beatty (2003:33).
See Lorsch and Spaulding (1999:11ff), and George (2002:22f).
Beatty (2002)
See Carter and Lorsch (2004:160f).
Lorsch et al. (1999:11f).
“75% of share options issued by major companies in America went to the top five executives [in each of those companies]” Newing (2003:6).
See Osterloh in Noetzli (2004:63).
To assess external fairness, companies could use remuneration comparisons, or they could use the DuPont approach, in the words of the CEO: “We no longer base the compensation of the CEO on what other CEOs are getting. Instead, we use the pay of the senior vice presidents — the people who actually run the business — as a benchmark, and then decide how much more the CEO ought to get. The CEO isn’t going to overpay the SVPs, because he has to make a return on them. So that avoids the upward spiral” (Elson, 2003:72).
Higgs Report, par. 12.24, in Carter and Lorsch (2004:135).
Böckli (1992:412).
See, for example, Porter (1992:81): “Compensation systems need to move in the direction of linking pay more closely to long-term company prosperity and to actions that improve the company’s competitive position.”
See Healy (2003:168ff).
See the guidelines for designing stock options developed by Brandes, et al (2003).
Higgs in Merson (2003:51).
Gray (2002:43). Elson (2003:73) adds three reasons why stock options should be replaced by stock: “First we’ve got to link pay to performance. But stock option plans are adopted for accounting reasons and are not geared to performance. Second, we want executives to hold onto equity portions longer. Executives paid in options can get out of their stock right away after they have exercised their options. Third, we want executives to bear some downside risk, and stock options, in the main, do not do that.”
Beatty (2003:10).
Bernhardt and Witt (1997: 85)
SWX_(2002:5).
SWX_(2002:7).
Garrett (2003:234).
Margerison and Mc Call (1985): in which, paradoxically, “creative” and “practical” are defined as opposites. Indeed, this fact is often criticized (see Henley, 2000).
Hilb, Müller and Wehrli (2003).
Dubs (2003:7f).
Dubs (2003:7f).
“Every one of the top ten on the list of the world’s most admired companies... has a boss who was appointed from inside” (The Economist, 6 March 2004:61).
Beatty (2003:17), and Ward (2003:27).
Carter and Lorsch (2004:149).
Carter and Lorsch (2004:131).
Conyon and Peck (1998) found that “top management pay and corporate performance were more aligned in companies with outside dominated boards and remuneration committees.”
See Michaels (2003:9).
KPMG (2002:77).
KPMG (2002:88).
See Carter and Lorsch (2004:107).
See Carter and Lorsch (2004:89).
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(2006). Integrated Board Management Dimension. In: New Corporate Governance. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-28168-1_4
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