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References
See Macus (2002).
Beiner, Schmid and Zimmerman, in Noetzli (2004:24).
George (2002:22f) “...it is hard to imagine that the failures at Enron, Swissair, K-Mart, and other companies would have happened if they’d had robust governance systems in place.”
“The most common statement I heard from directors and executives about the Fortune 500 companies was ‘Oh, the board of directors — that’s ten friends of the chief executive, a woman and a black!’” Garatt (2003:xxi). Further, according to Macus, in Noetzli (2004:51), studies show that board members who are similar in demographic characteristics to those of the CEO tend to perform their monitoring tasks less diligently.
Westphal and Frederickson (1999) and Peteraf (1993) found positive relationships between good selection and strategic success. According to Fields and Keys (2003:13) “a key factor in diversity’s successful impact on firm performance is the value found in the heterogeneity of ideas, experiences and innovations that diverse individuals bring to the firm.”
Cox (1993).
Maier (2002).
Macus (2002:11).
Hilb, Müller and Wehrle (2003).
Margerison and McCann (1985).
Henley (2000).
Maier (2002).
See also Staffelbach in Noetzli (2004: 47).
Macus (2002:12ff).
Jent (2003).
Jent (2003).
See Heyrick and Struggles (2005 study:14).
Martin (2004:1). Sweden is likely to implement a law in 2004 requiring a minimum of 25% of board seats to be held by women, and in Switzerland a parliamentary initiative is working to establish a law requiring a minimum of 30% of board seats to be held by women.
See Ackerman in Noetzli (2004:14).
The Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon Commission on Director Professionalism (NACD, 1998) recommends that “a substantial majority of the board should be independent and that serious consideration be given to board candidates with diverse backgrounds because of their unique experiences and perspectives that they offer. Candidates provide diverse contributions as a result of gender, ethnic background, geographic origin, or professional experience gained in the public, private or for profit sectors” (Fields and Keys, 2003:2).
The chairperson must therefore have the competence necessary to identify and manage conflicts arising on the basis of the multicultural nature of the board. See for example recommendations made by Appelbaum and Elbaz (1998).
Westphal (1999).
Carter and Lorsch (2004:127).
Ward (2003:21).
Müller (2003).
Carter and Lorsch (2004:146).
Müller (2003); see “Meeting Schedule Checklist”: Charon (2005:161–163).
Ward (2003:24).
“Following the collapse of such great companies as Enron, Tyco and Worldcom, much attention turned to the companies’ boards. Yet a close examination of these boards has revealed no broad pattern of incompetence or corruption. In fact, the boards followed most of the accepted standards of board operations... However, what distinguishes exemplary boards isn’t just following key structural tactics, but rather creating robust effective social systems. The key to generating such a team includes creating a climate of trust and candor, fostering a culture of open dissent, utilizing a fluid portfolio of roles...” Sonnenfeld (2002:16).
See Finkelstein and Mooney (2003) on p. 101 or the checklist for effective board processes.
See Macus (2002).
See Healy (2003:154): “The board’s large size... increased the inside-the-boardroom free-rider problem. (Why prepare if I’m a small player inside the boardroom?).” See also Fields and Keys (2003:16), who find that investors place higher value on earnings for companies with a small board. Australian and New Zealander firms are exemplary in that they have an average board size of seven (Healy, 2003:154).
Malik (2002).
See the “PA” approach (2000).
Fama and Jensen (1983).
Rindova (1999).
Keller (2002).
Adapted from Fama and Jensen (1983).
Wunderer (1995) and Westphal and Frederickson (2001).
Beatty (2003:18).
Chini (1986) and Guy (1999).
See Abdel (2001).
See Malik (1998); Beatty (2003:18) also suggests that in addition to annual board strategy workshops, boards review recent developments that could impact on the strategy at each board meeting.
This opinion contrasts with the usual shareholder-value maximization statements made, for example by Pitman in Garratt (2003:xxv).
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(2006). Strategic Dimension. In: New Corporate Governance. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-28168-1_3
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