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New Corporate Governance pp 15–66Cite as

Situational Dimension

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References

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  4. Since the seminal work of Berle and Means in 1932.

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  102. Ward (2003:22) cites a practical example developed by Young.

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(2006). Situational Dimension. In: New Corporate Governance. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-28168-1_2

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