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New Corporate Governance pp 1–14Cite as

Introduction

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References

  1. Taylor (2003:1).

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  2. Taylor (2003:3).

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  3. Business Week (September 23, 2002:14).

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  5. Gladwin et al. (1995).

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  7. See Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Eisenhardt (1989) and Aguilera and Jackson (2003:448ff).

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  8. Implying that some of the incentive systems in common use do not generate the alignment between principals and agents for which they were supposedly designed (Brecht et al, 2002:47).

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  9. Frey (2003:4).

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  10. Aquilera and Jackson (2003:448).

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  11. See Hung (1998:105).

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  12. Daily and Canella (2003:376).

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  21. See Neuberger (1995).

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  23. See Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983), Eisenhardt (1989).

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  24. See Freeman (1984) and for example, Donaldson and Preston (1995).

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  33. The graphical model of this idea is intended as more than a simple analogy. It should demonstrate “the key structure of the system under study” (Beer, 1981:75).

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© 2006 Springer Berlin · Heidelberg

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(2006). Introduction. In: New Corporate Governance. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-28168-1_1

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