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Legislative Coalitions in a Bargaining Model with Externalities

Chapter
Part of the Studies in Choice and Welfare book series (WELFARE)

Keywords

Ideal Point Winning Coalition Valid Strategy Bargaining Model Coalition Member 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Washington UniversitySt. Louis
  2. 2.Corporation for National and Community ServiceUSA

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