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Party Objectives in the “Divide a Dollar” Electoral Competition

Chapter
Part of the Studies in Choice and Welfare book series (WELFARE)

Summary

In the “divide a dollar” framework of distributive politics among three pivotal groups of unequal size, the paper compares two variants of two-party competition, the objective of a party being the probability of winning (“majority tournament” game) or the expected number of votes (“plurality” game). At a mixedequilibrium, all individuals are, on expectation, treated alike in the plurality game while the tournament game favors individuals in small groups.

Keywords

Social Choice Mixed Strategy Pure Strategy Gini Index American Political Science Review 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Ecole PolytechniqueFrance

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