Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Deliberation and Voting Rules

  • Chapter
Social Choice and Strategic Decisions

Part of the book series: Studies in Choice and Welfare ((WELFARE))

Summary

We analyze a formal model of decision-making by a deliberative committee. There is a given binary agenda. Individuals evaluate the two alternatives on both private and common interest grounds. Each individual has two sorts of private information going into committee: (a) perfect information about their personal bias and (b) noisy information about which alternative is best with respect to a (commonly held) normative criterion. Prior to a committee vote to choose an alternative, committee members engage in deliberation, modeled as a simultaneous cheap-talk game. We explore and compare equilibrium properties under majority and unanimity voting rules, paying particular attention to the character of debate (who influences who and how) and quality of the decision in each instance. On balance, majority rule induces more information sharing and fewer decision-making errors than unanimity. Furthermore, the influence and character of deliberation per se can vary more under majority rule than under unanimity.

Jeff Banks was a coauthor of one of us, a teacher of the other, and a friend to both. This paper is for him.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Aragones, E., I. Gilboa, A. Postlewaite and D. Schmeidler (2001) Rhetoric and analogies. Mimeo. University of Pennsylvania.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Austen-Smith, D. (1990) Information transmission in debate. American Journal of Political Science, 34: 124–152.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Austen-Smith, D. (1990) Credible debate equilibria. Social Choice and Welfare, 7: 75–93.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  4. Austen-Smith, D. (1993) Interested experts and policy advice: multiple referrals under open rule. Games and Economic Behavior, 5: 3–43.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  5. Austen-Smith, D. (1993) Information acquisition and orthogonal argument. In W. Barnett, M. Hinich and N. Schofield (eds) Political Economy: Institutions, Competition and Representation Cambridge: CUP.

    Google Scholar 

  6. Battaglini, M. (2002) Multiple referrals and multidimensional cheap talk. Econometrica, 70: 1379–1402.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Bohman, J. and W. Rehg (eds) (1997) Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Calvert, R. and J. Johnson (1998) Rational argument, political argument and democratic deliberation. Mimeo. Washington University, St. Louis.

    Google Scholar 

  9. Christiano, T. (1997) The significance of public deliberation. In J. Bohman and W. Rehg (eds) Deliberative Democracy Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  10. Cohen, J. (1989) Deliberation and democratic legitimacy. In A. Hamlin and P. Pettit (eds) The Good Polity Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  11. Coughlan, P. (2001) In defense of unanimous jury verdicts: mistrials, communication and strategic voting. American Political Science Review, 94: 375–93.

    Google Scholar 

  12. Diermeier, D. and T. Feddersen (2000) Information and congressional hearings. American Journal of Political Science, 44: 51–65.

    Google Scholar 

  13. Doraszelski, U., D. Gerardi and F. Squintani (2001) Communication and voting with double-sided information. Mimeo. Northwestern University.

    Google Scholar 

  14. Dryzek, J. and C. List (2003) Social choice theory and deliberative democracy: a reconciliation. British Journal of Political Science, 33: 1–28.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  15. Duggan, J. and C. Martinelli (2001) A Bayesian model of voting in juries. Games and Economic Behavior, 37: 259–94.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  16. Elster, J. (ed) (2000) Deliberative Democracy Cambridge: CUP.

    Google Scholar 

  17. Elster, J. (1986) The market and the forum. In J. Elster and A. Hylland (eds) Foundations of Social Choice Theory Cambridge: CUP [reprinted in J. Bohman and W. Rehg (eds) 1997: 3–33].

    Google Scholar 

  18. Eriksen, E. (2001) Democratic or technocratic governance? Mimeo. NYU School of Law.

    Google Scholar 

  19. Farrell, J. (1987) Cheap talk, coordination and entry. RAND Journal of Economics, 18: 34–39.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  20. Farrell, J. (1983) Meaning and credibility in cheap talk games. Games and Economic Behavior, 5: 514–31.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  21. Feddersen, T. and W. Pesendorfer (1996) The swing voter’s curse. American Economic Review, 86: 408–24.

    Google Scholar 

  22. Feddersen, T. and W. Pesendorfer (1997) Voting behavior and information aggregation in elections with private information. Econometrica, 65: 1029–1058.

    MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  23. Gerardi, D. and L. Yariv (2002) Putting your ballot where your mouth is-an analysis of collective choice with communication. Mimeo. Yale University.

    Google Scholar 

  24. Glazer, J. and A. Rubinstein (2001) Debates and decisions: on a rationale of argumentation rules. Games and Economic Behavior, 36: 158–173.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  25. Hafer, C. and D. Landa. (2003) Deliberation as self-discovery. Mimeo. New York University.

    Google Scholar 

  26. Karni, E. and Z. Safra (2002) Individual sense of justice: a utility representation. Econometrica, 70: 263–284.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  27. Knight, J. and J. Johnson (1997) What sort of equality does deliberative democracy require? In J. Bohman and W. Rehg (eds) Deliberative Democracy Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  28. Krishna, V and J. Morgan (2001) A model of expertise. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116: 747–75.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  29. Ladha, K. (1992) The Condorcet jury theorem, free speech and correlated votes. American Journal of Political Science, 36: 617–634.

    Google Scholar 

  30. Lipman, B. and D. Seppi (1995) Robust inference in communication games with partial provability. Journal of Economic Theory, 66: 370–405.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  31. Matthews, S. and A. Postlewaite (1995) On modeling cheap talk in Bayesian games. In J. Ledyard (ed) The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency and Stability Amsterdam: Kluwer Nijhoff.

    Google Scholar 

  32. McLean, I. and F. Hewitt (1994) Condorcet: Foundations of Social Choice and Political Theory Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  33. McLennan, A. (1998) Consequences of the Condorcet jury theorem for beneficial information aggregation by rational players. American Political Science Review, 92: 413–418.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  34. Meirowitz, A. (2004) In defense of exclusionary deliberation: communication and voting with private beliefs and values. Mimeo. Princeton University.

    Google Scholar 

  35. Ottaviani, M. and P. Sorensen (2001) Information aggregation in debate: who should speak first? Journal of Public Economics, 81: 393–422.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  36. Rabin, M. (1994) A model of pregame communication. Journal of Economic Theory, 63: 370–391.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  37. Sanders, L. (1997) Against deliberation. Political Theory, 25: 347–376.

    Google Scholar 

  38. Shapiro, I. (2000) Optimal deliberation. Mimeo. Yale University.

    Google Scholar 

  39. Walker, J. and D. Lane (1994) The jury system. Victorian Council for Civil Liberties, Criminal Justice DP 25/02/94.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Northwestern University, USA

    David Austen-Smith & Timothy Feddersen

Authors
  1. David Austen-Smith
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Timothy Feddersen
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Managerial Economics & Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL, 60208-2009, USA

    David Austen-Smith (Earl Dean Howard Distinguished Professor of Political Economy) (Earl Dean Howard Distinguished Professor of Political Economy)

  2. W. Allen Wallis Institute of Political Economy, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, 14627, USA

    John Duggan (Associate Professor of Political Science and Economics) (Associate Professor of Political Science and Economics)

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Austen-Smith, D., Feddersen, T. (2005). Deliberation and Voting Rules. In: Austen-Smith, D., Duggan, J. (eds) Social Choice and Strategic Decisions. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-27295-X_11

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation