Testing Theories of Lawmaking

Part of the Studies in Choice and Welfare book series (WELFARE)


Tests of formal models of legislative politics have become increasingly common, and have tended to draw confident and positive inferences about focal theories. This is not a particularly satisfactory development, however, inasmuch as the supposedly supported theories are quite different from one another, and the tests that generate the support tend overwhelmingly to focus on one theory rather than competing theories. We develop and employ a method of comparative theory-testing using estimates of cutpoints on final passage results. The findings are inconclusive in part because the theories, while substantively different, are often operationally nearly observationally equivalent.


Ideal Point Median Voter American Political Science Review Roll Call Final Passage 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Stanford UniversityUSA
  2. 2.Princeton UniversityPrinceton

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