Investigations of Granularity and Payoffs in 2×2 Games under Replicator Dynamics
This paper describes an investigation of several 2×2 games in iterated form. Players play the games repeatedly and are limited to mixed strategies, with particular actions chosen probabilistically. The games investigated include Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, and Stag Hunt in various forms. The reward structure and the granularity of the games—number of games played per generation in the replicator dynamics—are the main factors investigated, with surprising results.
KeywordsSuccessful Strategy Stochastic Game Replicator Dynamic Total Domination Stag Hunt Game
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