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Market games with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces: the core

  • Frank H. PageJr.
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Economic Theory book series (ECON.THEORY, volume 19)

Summary

We provide an alternative proof of the existence of core allocations in exchange economies with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces. We also identify a critical feature of information sharing rules that ensures nonemptiness of the core. In essence, the only condition we require on the sharing rules is that profitable “insider trading” be prohibited. In the absence of insider trading, balancedness is guaranteed and core nonemptiness follows.

Keywords

Banach Lattice Grand Coalition Inside Trading Coalition Member Market Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Frank H. PageJr.
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of FinanceUniversity of AlabamaTuscaloosaUSA

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