The core of an economy with differential information

  • Nicholas C. Yannelis
Part of the Studies in Economic Theory book series (ECON.THEORY, volume 19)


We introduce a new core concept for an exchange economy with differential information which is contained in the coarse core concept of Wilson (1978). We prove the existence of (i) a core allocation for an exchange economy with differential information and; (ii) an α-core strategy for a game in normal form with differential information.


Banach Lattice Exchange Economy Initial Endowment Order Interval Core Allocation 
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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nicholas C. Yannelis
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of IllinoisChampaignUSA

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