Coalition structure values in differential information economies: Is unity a strength?

  • Stefan Krasa1
  • Akram Temimi
  • Nicholas C. Yannelis
Part of the Studies in Economic Theory book series (ECON.THEORY, volume 19)


The coalition structure (CS) value, introduced by Owen [9] and Hart and Kurz [5], generalizes the Shapley value to social situations where coalitions form for the purpose of bargaining. This paper introduces the CS value to economies with differential information. We show that the private CS values exists and is Bayesian incentive compatible. Moreover, we construct examples that go against the intuitive viewpoint that “unity is strength.” In particular, we consider a three person economy in which two agents bargain as a unit against the third agent. We show that bargaining as a unit is advantageous if and only if information is complete. This result sheds new light on bargaining under differential information.


Private Information Coalition Structure Incentive Compatibility Coalition Member Feasible Allocation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. 1.
    Allen, B., Yannelis, N.C.: Differential information economies: Introduction. Economic Theory 18, 263–273 (2001)MathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Aumann, R.J., Dreze, J.: Cooperative games with coalition structures. International Journal of Game Theory 3, 214–237 (1974)CrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  3. 3.
    Einy, E., Shitovitz, B.: Private value allocations in large economies with differential information. Games and Economic Behavior 34, 287–311 (2001)CrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Glycopantis, D., Muir, A., Yannelis, N.C.: An extensive form interpretation of the private core. Economic Theory 18, 293–319 (2001)MathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Hart, S., Kurz, M.: Endogenous formation of coalitions. Econometrica 51, 1047–1064 (1983)MathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
    Krasa, S.: Unimprovable allocations in economies with differential information. Journal of Economic Theory 87, 144–168 (1999)CrossRefMathSciNetMATHGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    Krasa, S., Yannelis, N.C.: The value allocation of an economy with differential information. Econometrica 62, 881–900 (1994)Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Krasa, S., Yannelis, N.C.: Existence and properties of a value allocation for an economy with differential information. Journal of Mathematical Economics 25, 165–179 (1996)CrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Owen, G.: Values of games with a priori unions. In: Essays in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg NewYork 1977Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Shapley, L.S.: A value for n-person games. In: Contributions to the theory of games. Princeton University Press, 1953Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stefan Krasa1
    • 1
  • Akram Temimi
    • 2
  • Nicholas C. Yannelis
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of IllinoisChampaignUSA
  2. 2.Department of Economics, Finance and Legal StudiesUniversity of AlabamaTuscaloosa

Personalised recommendations