Advertisement

Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies

  • Guangsug Hahn
  • Nicholas C. Yannelis
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Economic Theory book series (ECON.THEORY, volume 19)

Summary

We introduce several efficiency notions depending on what kind of expected utility is used (ex ante, interim, ex post) and on how agents share their private information, i.e., whether they redistribute their initial endowments based on their own private information, or common knowledge information, or pooled information. Moreover, we introduce several Bayesian incentive compatibility notions and identify several efficiency concepts which maintain (coalitional) Bayesian incentive compatibility.

Keywords

Private Information Banach Lattice Grand Coalition Incentive Compatibility Information Economy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Aliprantis, C. D., O. Burkinshaw: Positive Operators. New York: Academic Press 1985Google Scholar
  2. Balder, E. J., N. C. Yannelis: On the Continuity of Expected Utility. Economic Theory 3, 625–643 (1993)CrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  3. Cartwright, D.: The Order Completeness of Some Spaces of Vector Valued Functions. Bulletin of the Australian Mathematical Society 11, 57–61 (1974)MathSciNetMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Diestel, J., J. J. Uhl: Vector Measures, Mathematical Surveys, No. 15. Providence: American Mathematical Society 1977Google Scholar
  5. Hahn, G., Nicholas C. Yannelis: Coalitional Bayesian Nash Implementation in Differential Information Economies. Working Paper, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (1995)Google Scholar
  6. Holmström, B., R. Myerson: Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information. Econometrica 51, 1799–1819 (1983)Google Scholar
  7. Kobayashi, T.: Equilibrium Contracts for Syndicates with Differential Information, Econometrica 48, 1635–1665 (1980)MathSciNetMATHGoogle Scholar
  8. Koutsougeras, L., N. C. Yannelis: Incentive Compatibility and Information Superiority of the Core of an Economy with Differential Information. Economic Theory 3, 195–216 (1993)CrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  9. Krasa, S., N. C. Yannelis: The Value Allocation of an Economy with Differential Information Econometrica 62, 881–900 (1994)Google Scholar
  10. Myerson, R.: Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 47, 61–74 (1979)MathSciNetMATHGoogle Scholar
  11. Palfrey, T., S. Srivastava: Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies. Econometrica 57, 115–134 (1986)MathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  12. Radner, R.: Equilibrium under Uncertainty. Econometrica 36, 31–58 (1968)MATHGoogle Scholar
  13. Wilson, R.: Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy. Econometrica 46, 807–816 (1978)MathSciNetMATHGoogle Scholar
  14. Yannelis, N. C.: The Core of an Economy with Differential Information. Economic Theory 1, 183–198 (1991)CrossRefMathSciNetMATHGoogle Scholar
  15. Yannelis, N. C., N. D. Prabhakar: Existence of Maximal Elements and Equilibria in Linear Topological Spaces. Journal of Mathematical Economics 12, 233–245 (1983)CrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Guangsug Hahn
    • 1
  • Nicholas C. Yannelis
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of IllinoisChampaignUSA

Personalised recommendations