Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information
We analyze the coarse, the fine, and the private core allocation of an exchange economy with differential information. The basic questions that we address are whether the above concepts are: (i) coalitionally incentive compatible, i.e., does truthful revelation of information in each coalition occur; and (ii) taking into account the information superiority or information advantage of an agent. Moreover, the above three concepts are examined in the presence of externalities and a comparison and interpretation of all of three core notions is provided.
KeywordsPrivate Information Banach Lattice Exchange Economy Initial Endowment Walrasian Equilibrium
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