Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information

  • Leonidas C. Koutsougeras
  • Nicholas C. Yannelis
Part of the Studies in Economic Theory book series (ECON.THEORY, volume 19)


We analyze the coarse, the fine, and the private core allocation of an exchange economy with differential information. The basic questions that we address are whether the above concepts are: (i) coalitionally incentive compatible, i.e., does truthful revelation of information in each coalition occur; and (ii) taking into account the information superiority or information advantage of an agent. Moreover, the above three concepts are examined in the presence of externalities and a comparison and interpretation of all of three core notions is provided.


Private Information Banach Lattice Exchange Economy Initial Endowment Walrasian Equilibrium 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Leonidas C. Koutsougeras
    • 1
  • Nicholas C. Yannelis
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignChampaignUSA

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