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Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies

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Differential Information Economies

Part of the book series: Studies in Economic Theory ((ECON.THEORY,volume 19))

Summary

We summarize here basic cooperative and noncooperative equilibrium concepts, in the context of differential information economies with a finite number of agents. These, on the one hand, game theoretic, and, on the other hand, Walrasian equilibrium type concepts are explained, and their relation is pointed out, in the context of specific economies with one or two goods and two or three agents. We analyze the incentive compatibility of several cooperative and noncooperative concepts, and also we discuss briefly the possible implementation of these concepts as perfect Bayesian equilibria through the construction of relevant game trees. This possibility is related to whether the allocation is incentive compatible. This depends on whether there is free disposal or not.

We are very grateful to A. Muir for his invaluable help and suggestions. We wish to thank A. Hadjiprocopis for his invaluable help with the implementation of Latex in a Unix environment. He also provided us with numerically approximate solutions to Radner equilibrium and weak fine value problems, using a random selection algorithm.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, City University, Northampton Square, London, EC1V 0HB, UK

    Dionysius Glycopantis

  2. Department of Economics, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, IL, 61820, USA

    Nicholas C. Yannelis

Authors
  1. Dionysius Glycopantis
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  2. Nicholas C. Yannelis
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, City University, Northhampton Square, London, EC1V OHB, Great Britain

    Dionysius Glycopantis

  2. Department of Economics, University of Illinois, 330 Commerce West Building, Champaign, IL, 61820, USA

    Nicholas C. Yannelis

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Glycopantis, D., Yannelis, N.C. (2005). Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies. In: Glycopantis, D., Yannelis, N.C. (eds) Differential Information Economies. Studies in Economic Theory, vol 19. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-26979-7_1

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