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The EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation: The Final Piece of the Regulatory Puzzle to Ensure Competitive Neutrality in Cross-Border M&A?

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Weaponising Investments

Part of the book series: Springer Studies in Law & Geoeconomics ((SSLG,volume 1))

Abstract

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) that have undue competitive advantages can distort the market in cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A transactions) and consequently lead to economic inefficiencies and welfare losses. Nevertheless, the issue of competitive neutrality regarding international M&A transactions has been left largely unaddressed in international trade and investment law as well as domestic competition, investment screening and anti-subsidy regimes. The new Regulation on Foreign Subsidies distorting the Internal Market (FSR) aims to fill this regulatory gap by introducing a kind of merger control regime for transactions facilitated by foreign subsidies. The tools provided in the FSR will allow the Commission to investigate M&A transactions undertaken by companies that benefit from foreign subsidies. In cases where the Commission finds that the foreign subsidy irremediably distorts the internal market, the concentration may even be prohibited. The tools of the FSR are generally well suited to prevent undue competitive advantages enjoyed by foreign SOEs in M&A transactions. However, as the tools are not mirroring those under EU state aid law, they potentially distort the level playing field. Several recently concluded international investment agreements (IIA) address the issue of competitive neutrality. In contrast to the FSR, they focus mainly on requirements for SOEs and deal only to a limited extent with subsidies in the context of cross-border M&A. To increase coherency and to reduce unpredictability and uncertainty regarding its new regulatory tools, the EU should aim to include general principles on subsidies and prohibitions of specific subsidies in its IIA. Finally, the extent to which the tools of the FSR are compliant with the EU’s national treatment obligations as stipulated in its IIA must be carefully examined.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Bian (2021), p. 562; Gordon and Milhaupt (2019), pp. 226 et seq.

  2. 2.

    OECD (2022), p. 5; OECD (2012), p. 17.

  3. 3.

    See for an overview of (undue, government-created) competitive advantages of SOEs Capobianco and Christiansen (2011), p. 2 et seq.; see also European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, COM(2021) 223 final, p. 2; Nielsen (1981), p. 57 et seq.; see further Enderwick (2017), p. 268.

  4. 4.

    Sauvant et al. (2014), p. 98.

  5. 5.

    See Gordon and Milhaupt (2018), p. 247; European Commission, White Paper on levelling the playing field as regards foreign subsidies, COM(2020) 253 final, p. 7; OECD (2016), p. 53; see further Trapp (2020), p. 965.

  6. 6.

    See European Commission, White Paper (fn. 4), p. 7; Gordon and Milhaupt (2018), p. 247; OECD (2012), p. 19.

  7. 7.

    See Geddes (2004), p. 29.

  8. 8.

    European Commission, White Paper (fn. 4), p. 7.

  9. 9.

    European Commission, White Paper (fn. 4), p. 9.

  10. 10.

    European Commission, White Paper (fn. 4), p. 9; see also Kühling et al. (2021), pp. 5 et seq.

  11. 11.

    European Commission, White Paper (fn. 4), p. 9; see also Baumann (2020), pp. 86 et seq.

  12. 12.

    European Commission, White Paper (fn. 4), pp. 9 et seq.; see also Crochet and Gustafsson (2021), pp. 347 et seq.

  13. 13.

    See European Commission, Proposal (fn. 2), p. 10.

  14. 14.

    Article 1(1) FSR.

  15. 15.

    See for an overview of existing rules Biau et al. (2016), pp. 7 et seq.; Chaisse (2016a), pp. 240 et seq.; Krenek and De Smijter (2021), pp. 7 et seq.; Nagy (2021), pp. 150 et seq.; OECD (2016), pp. 49 et seq.; see for the aim of the OECD guidelines on corporate goverance of state-owned enterprises OECD (2015), p. 11.

  16. 16.

    European Commission, Proposal (fn. 2), p. 10.

  17. 17.

    See recital 4 FSR.

  18. 18.

    Article 21(5) FSR.

  19. 19.

    Article 21(4) FSR.

  20. 20.

    Article 24(1) FSR.

  21. 21.

    Article 25(3)(c) FSR. See Article 7 FSR regarding commitments and redressive measures.

  22. 22.

    Article 9 FSR.

  23. 23.

    European Commission, Proposal (fn. 2), p. 10.

  24. 24.

    See recital 25 FSR.

  25. 25.

    See Baumann (2020), p. 82 et seq.; European Commission, White Paper (fn. 4), p. 9; Krenek and De Smijter (2021), p. 7 et seq.; Svetlicinii (2018), p. 14.

  26. 26.

    See recital 6 FSR; see further Briguet (2018), p. 857; Cunha Rodrigues (2021), p. 200 et seq.

  27. 27.

    See European Commission, Impact assessment accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, SWD(2021) final, p. 55.

  28. 28.

    See Article 3 FSR; see further Kühling et al. (2021), p. 8; Zöttl and Werner (2022), p. 476. However, there are also some noticeable differences between the definitions of “foreign subsidy” and intra-EU state aid (Luja (2021), p. 188).

  29. 29.

    OECD (2012), p. 83.

  30. 30.

    Baumann (2019), p. 342; OECD (2012), p. 83.

  31. 31.

    See Cunha Rodrigues (2021), p. 224.

  32. 32.

    Hahn (2021), p. 184; see also Kühling et al. (2021), p. 8.

  33. 33.

    Article 25(1) in connection with Article 14(2)(a) FSR.

  34. 34.

    Article 25(3)(c) and (6)(a) FSR; see also Luja (2021), pp. 196 et seq.

  35. 35.

    See with regard to joint ventures article 20(2) FSR; see article 20(1) FSR for the different concentration constellations.

  36. 36.

    Article 108(3) TFEU.

  37. 37.

    Article 108 TFEU does not stipulate any consequences in this regard. However, capital market rules may provide for a takeover not to be completed, while the examination under EU state aid law is still pending. In such cases, if the particular state aid is finally found to violate EU state aid law, the takeover bid would be withdrawn.

  38. 38.

    It must be noted in this respect, that in certain cases also under EU State Aid Law, companies subsidized by an EU Member State haven been required to divest certain assets or to refrain from acquiring a company (see European Commission, Impact Assessment (n 27), p. 55). Particularly, this is the case regarding to undertakings benefiting from restructuring aid (see Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring nonfinancial undertaking in difficulty (2014/C 249/01), para. 78 and para. 84).

  39. 39.

    See Monopolkommission (2020), para. 924, for a proposal in this regard.

  40. 40.

    See recital 23 FSR. According to the European Commission, White Paper (fn. 4), p. 23, the prohibition of an acquisition should only be used as a last resort.

  41. 41.

    See Clougherty and Zhang (2021), p. 472 et seq.

  42. 42.

    See article 3 and 4 FSR; see also European Commission, Impact Assessment (fn. 27), p. 54.

  43. 43.

    See article 7 FSR.

  44. 44.

    See article 7(4)(f) FSR.

  45. 45.

    See Clougherty and Zhang (2021), pp. 471 et seq.; see further Zöttl and Werner (2022), p. 486.

  46. 46.

    Article 46(1)(a) FSR; see also recital 73 FSR.

  47. 47.

    Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty.

  48. 48.

    Crochet and Gustafsson (2021), p. 362.

  49. 49.

    European Commission, Impact Assessment (n 27), p. 65.

  50. 50.

    European Commission, Impact Assessment (n 27), p. 65.

  51. 51.

    Article 4(2) FSR.

  52. 52.

    European Commission, Impact Assessment (n 27), p. 65.

  53. 53.

    See Hornkohl (2023), p. 143.

  54. 54.

    Hornkohl (2023), p. 143.

  55. 55.

    Krenek and De Smijter (2021), p. 17; Luja (2021), p. 190.

  56. 56.

    Article 4(3) FSR.

  57. 57.

    Article 6 FSR.

  58. 58.

    See recital 21 FSR.

  59. 59.

    Hornkohl (2023), p. 145; Zöttl and Werner (2022), p. 482.

  60. 60.

    Hornkohl (2023), p. 145.

  61. 61.

    See in detail Hornkohl (2023), pp. 145 et seq.; Zöttl and Werner (2022), p. 482.

  62. 62.

    See joint statement by the American Chamber of Commerce to the EU, the Europe India Chamber of Commerce, the European Australian Business Council, the Japan Business Council in Europe, the Korea Business Association Europe and the Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce, Foreign Subsidies Regulation: key EU trade and investment partners raise concerns, 1 June 2022, http://amchameu.eu/position-papers/foreign-subsidies-regulation-key-eu-trade-and-investment-partners-raise-concerns (last accessed 20 November 2022).

  63. 63.

    See recital 21 FSR according to which positive effects outside the internal market “should be taken into account, where appropriate, in order to avoid that the balancing gives rise to unjustified discrimination.”

  64. 64.

    See Zöttl and Werner (2022), p. 483.

  65. 65.

    Article 46(1)(b) FSR.

  66. 66.

    See European Commission, White Paper (fn. 4), p. 19.

  67. 67.

    ECJ, Judgment of 26 June 2003, C-404/00 – Commission/Spain, 2003, I-6695, ECLI:EU:C:2003:373, paras. 45 ff.

  68. 68.

    See article 7(4) FSR.

  69. 69.

    European Commission, White Paper (fn. 4), p. 19.

  70. 70.

    Article 7(6) FSR; see also recital 24 FSR.

  71. 71.

    Monopolkommission (2020), para. 892; see also Kühling et al. (2021), pp. 9 et seq. For example, a foreign company could be ordered to reduce capacity in a certain EU market in order to protect EU companies operating in this market.

  72. 72.

    Monopolkommission (2020), para. 892.

  73. 73.

    See Crochet and Gustafsson (2021), p. 362.

  74. 74.

    See European Commission, Proposal (fn. 2), p. 48, for the objective of FSR.

  75. 75.

    See Monopolkommission (2020), para. 889 et seq. and para. 924 et seq; see also Kühling et al. (2021), pp. 8 et seq.

  76. 76.

    See Monopolkommission (2020), para. 889 et seq., para. 924 et seq. and para. 987.

  77. 77.

    See Monopolkommission (2020), para. 940.

  78. 78.

    See Chaisse (2016a), p. 258.

  79. 79.

    See Crochet and Gustafsson (2021), pp. 361 et seq.; Nagy (2021), pp. 156 et seq.; see further Trapp (2020), p. 969 et seq.

  80. 80.

    Subedi (2016), p. 8. Two major types of IIAs are to be distinguished: bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and multilateral preferential trade and investment agreements (see Chaisse [2016b], p. 604, for a description of these two types).

  81. 81.

    Matsushita (2017), p. 188. The chapter on SOEs in the CPTPP is the same as in the initial Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP).

  82. 82.

    Matsushita (2017), p. 190.

  83. 83.

    Article 17.4(1)(a) CPTPP; see further Matsushita (2017), pp. 190 and 193; Willemyns (2016), p. 671; Yun (2016), pp. 8 et seq. Commercial considerations are factors such as price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation, etc., that a privately-owned enterprise in the relevant business or industry would normally take into account when taking a commercial decision (article 17.1 CPTPP).

  84. 84.

    See article 17.6 CPTPP; see Fleury and Marcoux (2016), pp. 459 et seq. and Yun (2016), pp. 10 et seq., for a discussion of non-commercial assistance as defined under article 17.1 CPTPP.

  85. 85.

    Article 17.6 CPTPP; see Kawase and Ambashi (2017), p. 19.

  86. 86.

    See Borlini (2020), pp. 329 et seq., for a critical appraisal of the commitments regarding SOEs under the CPTPP and the USMCA.

  87. 87.

    Article 22.6(1) USMCA; see Borlini (2020), pp. 330 et seq.

  88. 88.

    Article 22.6(1)(a) USMCA. The contracting parties must ensure that their respective SOEs comply with this obligation (article 22.6(3) USMCA).

  89. 89.

    See Xu (2022), pp. 103 et seq.

  90. 90.

    Section II. article 3bis CAI. In Section II article II CAI China has for the first time agreed on a precise and comprehensive definition of SOEs in an international agreement (see Mavroidis and Sapir (2022), p. 18).

  91. 91.

    Section III article 8(1) CAI. See further Mavroidis and Sapir (2022), p. 18; Xu (2022), pp. 104 et seq.

  92. 92.

    See Enderwick (2017), p. 269.

  93. 93.

    Article 7.2 and 18.5(1) CETA.

  94. 94.

    See Chaisse (2016a), p. 258.

  95. 95.

    Bian (2021), pp. 566 et seq.; Willemyns (2016), p. 680, also argues for including SOEs-specific obligations in international investment and trade agreements.

  96. 96.

    See Bian (2021), pp. 566 et seq. With further references.

  97. 97.

    Neumann (2019), p. 267 et seq.; Reinhold (2022), p. 208; see further Kühling et al. (2021), p. 9, mentioning the example of the EU-Singapore FTA in this regard.

  98. 98.

    The term “noncommercial assistance” is based on the language in the SCM Agreement (Willemyns (2016), p. 671).

  99. 99.

    See EU text proposal on State-owned enterprises, available at <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1865>.

  100. 100.

    See EU text proposal on Anti-competitive conduct, merger controls and subsidies, available at <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1865>.

  101. 101.

    Reinhold (2022), pp. 216 et seq.

  102. 102.

    See article 44(9) FSR; Reinhold (2022), p. 216.

  103. 103.

    See for an overview of the Australian competitive neutrality regime Baumann (2019), pp. 269 et seq.; Healey (2015), pp. 9 et seq.

  104. 104.

    Kühling et al. (2021), p. 9; see further Reinhold (2022), p. 217. Amendment 35 proposed by the European Parliament (COM(2021)0223 – C9-0167/2021 – 2021/0114(COD)), wanted to enable the Commission to consider “whether the third country has a system for the review of subsidies in place, which the Commission has found to provide guarantees, in law and in practice, that the level of protection against undue state intervention into market forces and unfair competition is at least equivalent to the level of protection within the Union, whether the subsidy has been cleared under that system and whether that clearance appears relevant also for the effects on the internal market.” However, this amendment has not made it into the final version of the FSR.

  105. 105.

    Bjorklund (2018), n. 21.01.

  106. 106.

    Bian (2021), p. 588. Whereas CETA extends national treatment to the pre-establishment phase (article 8.6 CETA), article 2.3 of the EU – Singapore Investment Protection Agreement does not.

  107. 107.

    See Crochet and Gustafsson (2021), p. 358, for a similar analysis under article XVII GATS; see further Bjorklund, n. 21.02, regarding de jure and de facto discriminations. Nagy (2021), p. 157, argues that based on the decisional practice of the Dispute Settlement Body, the EU may have a good case that the new tools do not violate the requirement of national treatment, but that it depends on how the tools are specifically shaped.

  108. 108.

    See Bian (2021), pp. 587 et seq.; see also Bjorklund (2018), n. 21.94; see further Bungenberg and Reinisch (2021), p. 459, regarding the broad exception from national treatment in article 8.2 CETA for “activities carried out in the exercise of governmental authority”.

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    Phil Baumann

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Baumann, P. (2023). The EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation: The Final Piece of the Regulatory Puzzle to Ensure Competitive Neutrality in Cross-Border M&A?. In: Hillebrand Pohl, J., Warchol , J., Papadopoulos, T., Wiesenthal, J. (eds) Weaponising Investments. Springer Studies in Law & Geoeconomics, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/17280_2023_9

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