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The Supply and Demand of Justice: What Policy Implications from the EU Justice Scoreboard?

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YSEC Yearbook of Socio-Economic Constitutions 2022

Part of the book series: YSEC Yearbook of Socio-Economic Constitutions ((YSEC,volume 2022))

Abstract

What is the right price for adjudication? The influence of prices in determining access to justice makes this question all the more problematic, as the free interaction between supply and demand for judicial services has notoriously a limited role in this area due to the pervasive role of state-determined tariffs. Fixing prices at too low a level is an easy way to satisfy the need for justice, but it may come at the cost of overlitigation, which squanders resources. Fixing prices at too high a level is an easy way to make justice quicker, but it may neglect the costs of reducing access to justice. Using the EU Justice Scoreboard—a unique policy instrument to measure the performance of EU national justice systems—the paper explores how the European Commission understands the role of adjudication costs. In so doing, it highlights how this tool addresses access to justice from an economic point of view. The paper’s findings show that the Scoreboard’s reporting on costs has evolved gradually. It shifted away from generic considerations on government expenditure (which involve a supply-side analysis) to adopt qualitative evaluations on the allocation of resources for litigants (which involve a demand-side analysis). Based on this interpretation, the paper critically assesses the value judgements underpinning the EU Justice Scoreboard and submits some observations on its nature and function as a policy tool.

This publication is made possible by the funding of the Vici project ‘Affordable Access to Justice: towards sustainable cost and funding mechanisms for civil litigation in Europe’ (project no VI.C.191.082), financed by the Dutch Research Council (NWO). See www.euciviljustice.eu.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Fukuyama (1989).

  2. 2.

    See e.g., Michaels (2009); Spamann (2015).

  3. 3.

    Hess (2021), paras 2.93ff.; Gascón Inchausti (2017), pp. 41ff.; Siems (2018) pp. 180ff.

  4. 4.

    All Scoreboard editions are available at the European Commission’s webpage https://ec.europa.eu.

  5. 5.

    EU Justice Scoreboard 2020, p. 3.

  6. 6.

    The term “rule-of-law crisis” has been widely used by the (at the time) Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding to describe disruptions of check and balances and crackdowns in the independence of national justice systems; See Reding (2013); Konstantinides (2017), p. 142.

  7. 7.

    See Parker (2012); Gunther (2012); Konstantinides (2017), pp. 146 and 148.

  8. 8.

    See Perju (2015); Dawson (2017), pp. 161–166; Budó (2014), pp. 5ff.

  9. 9.

    Halmai (2018).

  10. 10.

    Conan (2016), p. 172.

  11. 11.

    “We as a European Union need to stand firm on our values and on the rule of law, and that is why I think that we need to put in place an objective mechanism to assess the judicial systems in all of our 27 Member States”: Reding (2012a), p. 8.

  12. 12.

    “The judicial system lies at the heart of a healthy market”: Reding (2012b).

  13. 13.

    See European Commission (2014a), p. 5.

  14. 14.

    See EU Justice Scoreboard 2013, p. 21.

  15. 15.

    See EU Justice Scoreboard 2020, Foreword.

  16. 16.

    De Grauwe (2020), pp. 123–129.

  17. 17.

    Hinarejos (2020), p. 580.

  18. 18.

    See also European Commission (2012), pp. 12f.

  19. 19.

    See Hess (2021), para 2.96; Althammer (2015), p. 6.

  20. 20.

    EU Justice Scoreboard 2021, p. 3.

  21. 21.

    See e.g. Dawson and Muir (2012); Janse and Gramatikov (2012); Balfour and Stratulat (2012); Carrera et al. (2013); Carrera and Guild (2014); Hirsch Ballin (2016), p. 140.

  22. 22.

    European Commission (2003); Sadurski (2010), p. 394.

  23. 23.

    European Commission (2014b); Pech and Scheppele (2017).

  24. 24.

    Scheppele et al. (2020); Bogdanowicz and Schmidt (2018).

  25. 25.

    European Parliament (2013, 2014).

  26. 26.

    Van Rijckevorsel (2016), p. 444; Sedelmeier (2017), p. 347; Strelkov (2019), p. 15.

  27. 27.

    European Commission (2015).

  28. 28.

    “The EU Justice Scoreboard is an information tool which feeds the European Semester process and covers civil, commercial and administrative justice as these areas are key drivers for growth.”: European Commission (2015).

  29. 29.

    EU Justice Scoreboard 2014, p. 4; EU Justice Scoreboard 2021, p. 3.

  30. 30.

    E.g. EU Justice Scoreboard 2013, p. 6; EU Justice Scoreboard 2014, p. 8; EU Justice Scoreboard 2015, p. 8; EU Justice Scoreboard 2016, p. 4.

  31. 31.

    E.g. EU Justice Scoreboard 2018, Figs. 60 and 64–68; EU Justice Scoreboard 2021, Figs. 52–58.

  32. 32.

    Hess (2016), p. 10; Storskrubb (2017), p. 333.

  33. 33.

    Dawson and Muir (2013), p. 1965.

  34. 34.

    For a more detailed analysis of the providers, reliability and comparability of cost-related data included in the Scoreboard see Dori (2021).

  35. 35.

    For more on the motives to use the legal systems see Shavell (1997).

  36. 36.

    Mora-Sanguinetti and Martínez-Matute (2019); Esposito et al. (2014); OECD (2013), p. 4; Vereeck and Mühl (2000); Shavell (1997), pp. 586f. and 591.

  37. 37.

    OECD (2013), p. 7; Esposito et al. (2014), p. 6; Buscaglia and Ulen (1997), p. 288. Other factors that can increase productivity of courts include ICT, training, new case processing design and cultural changes, se Dakolias (1999), pp. 53ff.

  38. 38.

    Priest (1989), pp. 533ff.; cf. Voigt (2016), p. 202.

  39. 39.

    Decker (2014), pp. 20 and 71f.

  40. 40.

    Lambert (2017), pp. 36ff.

  41. 41.

    Landes and Posner (1979), p. 248; Gico (2020), p. 649.

  42. 42.

    EU Justice Scoreboard 2013, Fig. 20; EU Justice Scoreboard 2014, Fig. 24.

  43. 43.

    EU Justice Scoreboard 2015, pp. 3 and, 36.

  44. 44.

    EU Justice Scoreboard 2021, Figs. 29–30.

  45. 45.

    EU Justice Scoreboard 2021, p. 38.

  46. 46.

    E.g. EU Justice Scoreboard 2015, Fig. 50; EU Justice Scoreboard 2016, Figs. 50–51.

  47. 47.

    EU Justice Scoreboard 2017, Fig. 49.

  48. 48.

    EU Justice Scoreboard 2019, Fig. 31.

  49. 49.

    See EU Justice Scoreboard 2019, p. 42.

  50. 50.

    EU Justice Scoreboard 2016, p. 16.

  51. 51.

    Ibid., Figs. 10 and 12.

  52. 52.

    Ibid., p. 16.

  53. 53.

    So e.g., the drop observed between 2013 and 2015 in the number of incoming cases in Spain was also attributed to the exclusion of payment orders; EU Justice Scoreboard 2016, Figs. 3 and 10.

  54. 54.

    Ibid., p. 16.

  55. 55.

    Mora-Sanguinetti and Martínez-Matute (2019).

  56. 56.

    EU Justice Scoreboard 2017, p. 5.

  57. 57.

    See also European Parliament (2015a), p. 65.

  58. 58.

    Ibid, pp. 62ff; European Parliament (2015b), pp. 101ff.

  59. 59.

    For the differences of access that litigants have to funds for their court cases and more generally to legal advice in the USA see Galanter (1974).

  60. 60.

    See EU Justice Scoreboard 2020, Fig. 26.

  61. 61.

    The disparities appeared prima facie higher when considering the figures from Austria (2950 EUR) and Malta (682 EUR). However, while the scenario was not fully applicable to the Austrian system of reimbursement, lawyer’s fees in Malta are calculated based on the value of the claim; ibid., p. 29.

  62. 62.

    EU Justice Scoreboard 2016, p. 19.

  63. 63.

    Idem.

  64. 64.

    EU Justice Scoreboard 2017, Fig. 21 and p. 35.

  65. 65.

    Denmark, Germany, Ireland, France, Croatia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Portugal, Finland and Sweden; ibid., p. 19.

  66. 66.

    Hungary, Romania, and United Kingdom (Scotland only); idem.

  67. 67.

    EU Justice Scoreboard 2018, Fig. 26 and p. 39.

  68. 68.

    Ibid., p. 39.

  69. 69.

    See EU Justice Scoreboard 2019, p. 41.

  70. 70.

    Ibid., Fig. 22.

  71. 71.

    Ibid., Fig. 21.

  72. 72.

    Ibid., p. 41.

  73. 73.

    EU Justice Scoreboard 2017, Fig. 22.

  74. 74.

    This conclusion can be loosely inferred from the fact that the level of court fees remained stable in the two scenarios selected for a high- and low-value consumer claim; idem.

  75. 75.

    See e.g. EU Justice Scoreboard 2018, Figs. 26–27.

  76. 76.

    Ibid., p. 35.

  77. 77.

    EU Justice Scoreboard 2016, Fig. 18.

  78. 78.

    Ibid., p. 33.

  79. 79.

    See EU Justice Scoreboard 2018, p. 39.

  80. 80.

    See EU Justice Scoreboard 2021, pp. 31ff.

  81. 81.

    For a more detailed and critical assessment of the Scoreboard data providers and the overall quality of the cost-related data they provide see Dori (2021).

  82. 82.

    See e.g. EU Justice Scoreboard 2013, p. 13; EU Justice Scoreboard 2021, p. 35.

  83. 83.

    See EU Justice Scoreboard 2016, p. 20; EU Justice Scoreboard 2020, p. 25.

  84. 84.

    See e.g. EU Justice Scoreboard 2016, Fig. 22.

  85. 85.

    See EU Justice Scoreboard 2017, Figs. 29 and 31.

  86. 86.

    See EU Justice Scoreboard 2021, Fig. 40.

  87. 87.

    Ibid., Figs. 41–42.

  88. 88.

    Dori and Richard (2017), pp. 326f.

  89. 89.

    See e.g. EU Justice Scoreboard 2015, Fig. 34; EU Justice Scoreboard 2021, Fig. 27.

  90. 90.

    See e.g. EU Justice Scoreboard 2015, Fig. 26; EU Justice Scoreboard 2021, Fig. 44.

  91. 91.

    EU Justice Scoreboard 2019, Fig. 20; EU Justice Scoreboard 2020, Fig. 22; EU Justice Scoreboard 2021, Fig. 39.

  92. 92.

    See e.g. EU Justice Scoreboard 2015, Fig. 29; EU Justice Scoreboard 2021, Fig. 47.

  93. 93.

    EU Justice Scoreboard 2021, Fig. 44.

  94. 94.

    Figure 1 of all EU Justice Scoreboard editions from 2016 to 2021.

  95. 95.

    See e.g. EU Justice Scoreboard 2015, Fig. 50.

  96. 96.

    See Sect. 2.1.

  97. 97.

    See EU Justice Scoreboard 2013, Fig. 20.

  98. 98.

    See e.g. EU Justice Scoreboard 2014, Figs. 25–26; EU Justice Scoreboard 2015, Figs. 40–41; EU Justice Scoreboard 2016, Figs. 28–29.

  99. 99.

    See EU Justice Scoreboard 2019, Fig. 31; EU Justice Scoreboard 2020, Fig. 34; EU Justice Scoreboard 2021, Fig. 31.

  100. 100.

    See e.g. EU Justice Scoreboard 2015, Figs. 38–41.

  101. 101.

    Ibid., p. 36.

  102. 102.

    EU Justice Scoreboard 2015, Fig. 50.

  103. 103.

    Idem.; EU Justice Scoreboard 2016, Figs. 50–51.

  104. 104.

    EU Justice Scoreboard 2017, Figs. 47–48.

  105. 105.

    Ibid., Fig. 49.

  106. 106.

    Dori (2021), p. 292.

  107. 107.

    Idem.

  108. 108.

    See EU Justice Scoreboard 2017, Fig. 22.

  109. 109.

    Dori (2021), pp. 292f.

  110. 110.

    See EU Justice Scoreboard 2020, p. 28; EU Justice Scoreboard 2021, p. 23.

  111. 111.

    EU Justice Scoreboard 2020, Fig. 25; EU Justice Scoreboard 2021, Fig. 25.

  112. 112.

    EU Justice Scoreboard 2020, Fig. 26; EU Justice Scoreboard 2021, Fig. 26.

  113. 113.

    See Biard et al. (2021), pp. 9f.

  114. 114.

    For the lack of neutrality regarding the Scoreboard data providers of cost-related indicator see Dori (2021), pp. 287f.

  115. 115.

    See supra n. 90.

  116. 116.

    See supra n. 91.

  117. 117.

    See supra n. 89.

  118. 118.

    Dori (2021), p. 293.

  119. 119.

    EU Justice Scoreboard 2015, Fig. 1.

  120. 120.

    Ibid. Fig. 39.

  121. 121.

    EU Justice Scoreboard 2016, Fig. 19.

  122. 122.

    EU Justice Scoreboard 2017, Fig. 21; EU Justice Scoreboard 2018, Fig. 26; EU Justice Scoreboard 2019, Fig. 21; EU Justice Scoreboard 2020, Fig. 23; EU Justice Scoreboard 2021, Fig. 23.

  123. 123.

    EU Justice Scoreboard 2013, p. 20.

  124. 124.

    EU Justice Scoreboard 2014, p. 27.

  125. 125.

    For more on the Scoreboard data providers in general and particularly for cost-related indicators see Dori (2021).

  126. 126.

    Ibid., pp. 283ff.

  127. 127.

    EU Justice Scoreboard 2014, p. 4.

  128. 128.

    See also Ontanu et al. (2017), pp. 15f.

  129. 129.

    The only exception has been the synthetic indicator presenting follow-up measure to ensure compliance with unmet time standards, which examined to what extent allocation of additional financial and human resources is foreseen in cases of lengthy judicial proceedings.

  130. 130.

    See e.g. EU Justice Scoreboard 2021, pp. 21 and 26.

  131. 131.

    See also Ippoliti and Tria (2020), p. 387.

  132. 132.

    Voigt (2016), pp. 185ff.; Månsson et al. (2022), p. 432.

  133. 133.

    Law (2016), entry “economy, efficiency, and effectiveness”: Efficiency measures how successfully the inputs have been transformed into outputs. Effectiveness measures how successfully the system achieves its desired outputs.

  134. 134.

    See also Månsson et al. (2022), p. 432.

  135. 135.

    OECD (2013), p. 5.

  136. 136.

    Voigt and El-Bialy (2016), pp. 195ff.

  137. 137.

    See also Gico (2020), pp. 658ff. (with further references).

  138. 138.

    Ibid., pp. 646 and 660 (with further references).

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Dori, A. (2023). The Supply and Demand of Justice: What Policy Implications from the EU Justice Scoreboard?. In: Storskrubb, E. (eds) YSEC Yearbook of Socio-Economic Constitutions 2022. YSEC Yearbook of Socio-Economic Constitutions, vol 2022. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/16495_2023_51

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