Internet Platforms and Freedom of Expression in Constitution-Making

Ragnarsson, Kári Hólmar

doi:10.1007/16495_2021_37

Internet Platforms and Freedom of Expression in Constitution-Making

Kári Hólmar Ragnarsson¹⁶

Chapter
First Online: 10 April 2022

126 Accesses

Part of the YSEC Yearbook of Socio-Economic Constitutions book series (YSEC,volume 2021)

Abstract

Internet speech provides opportunities for democratic discourse but has also proven to cause harm to democracy by elevating disinformation, harassment, and extremism. Regulating power in the digital world challenges traditional understandings of freedom of expression and might require a legal response at the constitutional level. This article explores how Internet speech and freedom of expression have been addressed in three constitutional reform processes commenced after the 2008 financial crisis in Iceland, Ireland, and Norway. In all cases the novel or emerging problems involving Internet speech, and particularly the power of Internet platforms, were missed by constitutional reformers while positive aspects of Internet speech were embraced and granted constitutional protection. The experiences highlight, among other things, the importance of timing of constitutional reform: Reformers necessarily focus mostly on problems of the past but the timing of a “constitutional moment” may not be optimal to address what will become pressing problems. Reformers are constrained, or perceive themselves to be constrained, by international law and traditional constitutional law doctrine where the state is the principal risk for fundamental rights. The power of private entities, including Internet platforms, goes unaddressed, and the global scale of Internet speech, far beyond the territorial jurisdiction of constitutional law, presents various complexities.

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

Chapter: USD 29.95; Price excludes VAT (USA)

eBook: USD 139.00; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Hardcover Book: USD 179.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

1.
For an exploration of democracy as the foundation of freedom of expression see Schauer (1983).
2.
E.g. Fishkin and Mansbridge (2017).
3.
ECtHR: Handyside v. the United Kingdom, no. 5493/72, § 49, Series A-24.
4.
Id.
5.
See Sect. 2 below.
6.
Anderson and Rainie (2020).
7.
See generally e.g. Contiades (2013).
8.
Suzor, 2018, p. 2. See generally Celeste (2019), Redeker et al. (2018), De Gregorio (2021).
9.
Suzor (2020), p. 2.
10.
Suzor (2020), p. 1.
11.
De Gregorio (2021), p. 2.
12.
E.g. Benkler (2006), p. 212, Massaro and Norton (2021), pp. 1634–1635, Wu (2018), p. 554.
13.
E.g. De Gregorio (2021), p. 1.
14.
ECtHR: Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, no. 48226/10, §§ 49 and 52, 1 December 2015.
15.
ECtHR: Ahmet Yıldırım v. Turkey, no. 3111/10, 18 December 2012, ECtHR: Akdeniz v. Turkey, no. 20877/10 (dec.), 11 March 2014, ECtHR: Vladimir Kharitonov v. Russia, no 10795/14, 23 June 2020.
16.
ECtHR: Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], no. 64569/09, 6 June 2015.
17.
ECtHR: Perrin v. the United Kingdom, no. 5446/03 (dec.), 18 October 2005.
18.
ECtHR: Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary, no. 22947/13, § 87, 2 February 2016.
19.
Id, § 86.
20.
ECtHR: Appleby and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 44306/98, § 44, ECHR 2003-VI.
21.
ECtHR: Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, no. 48226/10, § 49, 1 December 2015.
22.
Council of Europe (2014).
23.
UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression (2011).
24.
Balkin (2014).
25.
E.g. Douek (2021).
26.
Hofverberg (2021).
27.
Massaro and Norton (2016), Kaminski et al. (2017).
28.
CJEU: CJEU, Case C-18/18, Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Limited, ECLI:EU:C:2019:821.
29.
Wu (2018), p. 548.
30.
Wu (2018), pp. 555–556.
31.
Massaro and Norton (2021).
32.
But see Tushnet (2021) (arguing that in fact the U.S. First Amendment doctrine as it stands is flexible enough to accommodate all the suggested responses).
33.
Wu (2018), p. 568.
34.
Redeker et al. (2018).
35.
Constitution of Mexico 1917 (rev. 2015), Constitution of Sudan (2019), Constitution of Georgia 1995 (rev. 2018).
36.
Constitution of Greece.
37.
Constitution of Ecuador 2008 (rev. 2021), Articles 16.2 and 384.
38.
Freedom House (2019) Freedom House gives the country the score of 4/6 in the relevant category.
39.
The Guardian (2015).
40.
The Associated Press (2019).
41.
IMF (2018), p. 74.
42.
E.g. Funke et al. (2016) (finding that polarisation in politics and the vote share of far-right parties increases after financial crises) and Tooze (2018), pp. 564–599 (tracing the connection from the 2008 financial crisis to the election of Donald Trump as US president).
43.
E.g. Contiades (2013).
44.
Elster (1995), Ackerman (2015).
45.
Ackerman (1991), p. 5. But see e.g. Sajó (2005), p. 243 (noting that “the vast majority” of constitutions does not originate in such moments).
46.
Contiades (2013).
47.
Id.
48.
See Democratic Decay & Renewal (2021).
49.
In the process of case-selection, we reviewed the freedom of expression clauses of all the European constitutions coded in the Constitute database (https://www.constituteproject.org/) and reviewed in full all European constitutions amended after 2008, with a view of identifying specific clauses on Internet speech. We are therefore confident that no essential case is left out of the sample of three. Georgia warrants special attention as its Constitution, amended in 2018, guarantees Internet access. However, serious concerns have been expressed as to the democratic qualities of the amendment process, warranting its exclusion from this study, see Venice Commission (2017).
50.
Bibler (2010).
51.
Oddsson and Mathiesen (2008), p. 1.
52.
See Árnason and Dupré (2021) for accounts in English from many of the central actors in the story.
53.
E.g. Tushnet (2016), Elster (2016), Meuwese (2013), Landemore (2014).
54.
Supreme Court of Iceland: Ákvörðun Hæstaréttar vegna kosningar til stjórnlagaþings [Decision of the Supreme Court Regarding Elections to the Constitutional Assembly] 25 January 2011.
55.
Stjórnlagaráð [Constitutional Council] (2011a).
56.
E.g. Lessig (2016).
57.
Gylfason and Meuwese (2017).
58.
Gunnarsson (2019).
59.
Hagstofa Íslands (2010).
60.
Stjórnlagaráð [Constitutional Council] (2011a).
61.
Þórhallsson (2011a).
62.
Þórhallsson (2011b).
63.
Stjórnlagaráð [Constitutional Council] (2011a), p. 54.
64.
Id.
65.
Stjórnlagaráð [Constitutional Council] (2011b), p. 387 (Mr. Vilhjálmur Þorsteinsson), p. 394 (Ms. Katrín Oddsdóttir).
66.
Stjórnlagaráð [Constitutional Council] (2011b), p. 388 (Mr. Þorkell Helgason), pp. 390–391 (Mr. Erlingur Sigurðarson), p. 483 (Mr. Ómar Ragnarsson).
67.
Stjórnlagaráð [Constitutional Council] (2011b), pp. 388, 402, 551.
68.
This emphasis on negative obligations is sometimes lost in discussions about the Council’s proposals. For example, the main Wikipedia entry on “The 2010–2013 Icelandic constitutional reform ‘lists’ obliging the state to provide Internet access to all citizens” as among the important proposals of the Council, see Wikipedia (2021).
69.
Stjórnlagaráð [Constitutional Council] (2011b), p. 394 (Ms. Katrín Oddsdóttir).
70.
For an assessment of the Arab Spring some 10 years later see Feldman (2020).
71.
See generally e.g. Perisly and Tucker (2020).
72.
Althingi (2012a), p. 72.
73.
Althingi (2012b).
74.
Althingi (2012c), on Article 16.
75.
Id.
76.
Lenihan and Honohan (2010).
77.
Farrell et al. (2017), p. 121.
78.
Dáil Éireann (2012).
79.
Blokker (2017), p. 46.
80.
Farrell et al. (2017), p. 120.
81.
Farrell et al. (2017), pp. 124–130.
82.
Blokker (2017), p. 51, Farrell et al. (2017), p. 131 (claiming that “As a process, the Irish Constitutional Convention was a great success,” while the assessment is less clear in terms of outcomes.) See also Suteu (2015) (highlighting both positive and negative aspects).
83.
Carolan (2015).
84.
The Convention on the Constitution (2014).
85.
O’Mahony (2012), cited in Carolan (2015), p 739.
86.
The Convention on the Constitution (2014).
87.
House of the Oireachtas (2008), p. 69.
88.
Public Submissions to the Convention on the Constitution (2014).
89.
The Convention on the Constitution (2014).
90.
Fry’s statements included: “The god that created this universe, if it was created by a god, is quite clearly a maniac, utter maniac, totally selfish.”
91.
Referendum Commission (2019).
92.
House of the Oireachtas (2008), p. 73.
93.
Humanist Association of Ireland (2014) and Atheist Ireland (2014).
94.
Id.
95.
The Convention on the Constitution (2014).
96.
See generally Dixon and Landau (2021).
97.
Act No. 30/1999, Lov om styrking av. menneskerettighetenes stilling i norsk rett (Menneskerettsloven).
98.
Bårdsen (2016), p. 4.
99.
Kierulf (2018), p. 239.
100.
Id, p. 240.
101.
Id, pp. 239–240.
102.
Id, p. 240.
103.
Id, pp. 242–243.
104.
Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway 1814 (rev. 2020), Chapter E (human rights).
105.
Kunngjøring av Grunnlovsbestemmelse om endring av Grunnloven § 100, FOR-2004-10-29-1402.
106.
Menneskerettighetsutvalget [Human Rights Committee] (2011), p. 160.
107.
Id, pp. 161–163.
108.
Id.
109.
Id, pp. 159–163.
110.
NOU (1999).
111.
Id, pp. 70–72.
112.
Id, p. 70.
113.
Id, p. 71.
114.
Id, p. 72.
115.
Id, p. 71.
116.
Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway 1814 (rev. 2020), Article 100, para. 2, sentence 1. (Emphasis added).
117.
NOU (1999), p 249.
118.
Id, pp. 88 and 249–250.
119.
Id, p. 249.
120.
Id, p. 250.
121.
Ministry of Culture (2020).
122.
Id.
123.
Ytringsfrihetskommisjonen (2021).
124.
De Gregorio (2021).
125.
Ghosh (2019).
126.
Cited in Douek (2021), p. 765.
127.
Hofverberg (2021). We should stress the inclusion of the word “almost” in this sentence.
128.
Stjórnlagaráð [Constitutional Council] (2011a), pp. 46–48.
129.
Sérfræðingahópur (2012), p. 7.
130.
Althingi (2012b, c).
131.
Menneskerettighetsutvalget [Human Rights Committee] (2011), p. 46.
132.
Id.
133.
Gardbaum (2003).
134.
Althingi (2012a), p. 43.
135.
CJEU: CJEU, Case C-18/18, Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Limited, ECLI:EU:C:2019:821.
136.
The Convention on the Constitution (2014) (setting out as annexes presentations from legal experts).
137.
Althingi (2012c).
138.
ECHR, Article 53.
139.
Venice Commission (2012).
140.
Elster (2016).
141.
NOU (1999), pp. 197–238, Menneskerettighetsutvalget [Human Rights Committee] (2011), pp. 34–39.
142.
Helgadóttir (2014).
143.
The Convention on the Constitution (2014).
144.
Dixon and Landau (2021).
145.
See e.g. Choudhry and Tushnet (2020), Democratic Constitutional Design (2021).
146.
On that topic see e.g. Tushnet (2008).
147.
Carolan (2015).
148.
See Elster (2016), p. 197.
149.
Stjórnlagaráð [Constitutional Council] (2011a), p. 54 (attributing the view that access to the Internet has been “defined as a human right” to the UNHCHR, while, in fact the cited report of a UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression does not go so far, although certainly highlighting the importance of access to the Internet for rights enjoyment, see UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression (2011).
150.
Scheppele (2008), p. 1379.
151.
E.g. Skach (2005).
152.
To be clear, the Irish Convention also addressed very contemporary problems, including abortion and same-sex marriage.
153.
On the endurance of constitutions generally see Elkins et al. (2009).
154.
NOU (1999).
155.
Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway 1814 (rev. 2020), Article 100.
156.
For one version of a broad indeterminacy thesis associated with critical legal studies see Tushnet (1996).
157.
Stjórnlagaráð [Constitutional Council] (2011b), p. 388 (Mr. Þorkell Helgason), pp. 390–391 (Mr. Erlingur Sigurðarson), p. 483 (Mr. Ómar Ragnarsson).
158.
Elkins et al. (2009).
159.
See generally Scheppele (2008).
160.
Stjórnlagaráð [Constitutional Council] (2011b), p. 394 (Ms. Katrín Oddsdóttir).
161.
The classic analysis of “unintended consequences,” including their sources, is Merton (1936).
162.
Jefferson (1789).
163.
E.g. the Federalist Papers: No. 49 (1788).
164.
Elkins et al. (2009), p. 18.
165.
Fontaine (2020), interviewing activist/lawyer Helga Baldvins Bjargardóttir (“Of course, it’s not perfect. It’s supposed to be a living instrument.”).
166.
Lansberg-Rodriguez (2010). Incidentally, the neologism “wiki-constitutionalism” has no relationship to the kind of crowdsourcing associated with Wikipedia but describes the tendency of constant rewriting of constitutions practiced in some states, especially in Latin America.

References

Ackerman B (1991) We the people: foundations. Belknap Press, Cambridge
Google Scholar
Ackerman B (2015) Three paths to constitutionalism – and the crisis of the European Union. Br J Polit Sci 45(3):705–714
CrossRef Google Scholar
Althingi (2012a) Frumvarp til stjórnarskipunarlaga um stjórnarskrá lýðveldisins Íslands. Submitted to the 141^st legislative session 2012–2013, document 510, https://www.althingi.is/altext/141/s/pdf/0510.pdf
Althingi (2012b) Frumvarp til stjórnarskipunarlaga um stjórnarskrá lýðveldisins Íslands. Ákvæði frumvarpsins með fyrirhuguðum breytingum. [Consolidated final version of the 2012 constitutional bill] https://www.stjornarradid.is/media/forsaetisraduneyti-media/media/stjornarskra/Frumvarp_til_stjornarskipunarlaga_lokagerd.pdf
Althingi (2012c) Framhaldsnefndarálit um frumvarp til stjórnarskipunarlaga um stjórnarskrá lýðveldisins Íslands. Frá meiri hluta stjórnskipunar- og eftirlitsnefndar [Constitutional and Oversight Committee’s majority opinion on the 2012 constitutional bill]. Submitted to the 141^st legislative session 2012–2013, document 1111, https://www.althingi.is/altext/141/s/1111.html
Anderson and Rainie (2020) Concerns about democracy in the digital age. Pew Research Center, 21 February 2020. https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2020/02/21/concerns-about-democracy-in-the-digital-age/
Árnason ÁÞ, Dupré C (eds) (2021) Icelandic constitutional reform: people, processes, politics. Routledge, New York
Google Scholar
Atheist Ireland (2014) Submission from Atheist Ireland to Constitutional Convention on Removing the Offence of Blasphemy, http://www.constitutionalconvention.ie/AttachmentDownload.ashx?aid=3700a009-d7f3-e211-a5a0-005056a32ee4
Balkin J (2014) Old-school/new-school speech regulation. Harv Law Rev 127(8):2296–2342
Google Scholar
Bårdsen A (2016) Guardians of human rights in Norway: challenging mandates in a new era. Address to the Centre on Law and Social Transformation in collaboration with Bergen Resource Center, Litteraturhuset Bergen 11 May 2016, https://www.domstol.no/globalassets/upload/hret/artikler-og-foredrag/guardians-of-human-rights%2D%2D-11052016.pdf
Benkler Y (2006) The wealth of networks: how social production transforms markets and freedom. Yale University Press, New Haven
Google Scholar
Bibler J (2010) Hversu stórt var fall íslensku bankanna á heimsmælikvarda? FME [ICELANDIC FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY], 12 March 2010, http://www.fme.is/media/frettir/12.03.2010.Hlutfoll-JEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7J9-LSPC]
Blokker P (2017) Constitutional reform in Europe and recourse to the people. In: Contiades S, Fotiado A (eds) Participatory constitutional change: the people as amenders of the constitution. Routledge, New York
Google Scholar
Carolan E (2015) Ireland's constitutional convention: behind the hype about citizen-led constitutional change. Int J Const Law 13(3):733–748
Google Scholar
Celeste E (2019) Digital constitutionalism: a new systematic theorisation. Int Rev Law Comput Technol 33(1):76–99
CrossRef Google Scholar
Choudhry S, Tushnet M (2020) Participatory constitution-making: introduction. Int J Const Law 18(1):173–178
Google Scholar
Constitution of Ecuador 2008 (rev. 2021). https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ecuador_2021?lang=en
Constitution of Greece as revised by the parliamentary resolution of May 27th 2008 of the VIIIth Revisionary Parliament., https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/001-156%20aggliko.pdf
Constitution of Mexico 1917 (rev. 2015), Eng transl, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mexico_2015?lang=en,
Constitution of Sudan 2019, Eng transl., https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Sudan_2019?lang=en,
Constitution of Georgia 1995 (rev. 2018), Eng transl, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Georgia_2018?lang=en,
Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway 1814 (rev. 2020). https://lovdata.no/dokument/NLE/lov/1814-05-17?q=grunnloven
Contiades X (ed) (2013) Constitutions in the global financial crisis: a comparative analysis. Ashgate, Surrey
Google Scholar
Council of Europe (2014) Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)6 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on a Guide to human rights for Internet users
Google Scholar
Dáil Éireann (2012) Resolution calling a Convention on the Constitution, http://www.constitutionalconvention.ie/Documents/Terms_of_Reference.pdf
De Gregorio G (2021) The rise of digital constitutionalism in the European Union. Int J Const Law. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moab001
Democratic Constitutional Design (2021), http://stjornarskra.hi.is/en/about/
Democratic Decay & Renewal (2021), https://www.democratic-decay.org/
Director, IMF, 15 November 2008
Google Scholar
Dixon R, Landau D (2021) Abusive constitutional borrowing. Oxford University Press, Oxford
CrossRef Google Scholar
Douek E (2021) Governing online speech: from “posts-as-trumps” to proportionality and probability. Columbia Law Rev 121(3):759–833
Google Scholar
Elkins Z, Ginsburg T, Melton J (2009) The endurance of national constitutions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
CrossRef Google Scholar
Elster J (1995) Forces and mechanisms in the constitution-making process. Duke Law J 45(2):364–396
CrossRef Google Scholar
Elster J (2016) Icelandic constitution-making in comparative perspective. In: Ingimundarson V et al (eds) Iceland’s financial crisis: the politics of blame, protest, and reconstruction. Routledge, New York, pp 187–202
Google Scholar
Farrell D, Harris C, Suiter J (2017) Bringing people into the heart of constitutional design. The Irish constitutional convention of 2012–14. In: Contiades S, Fotiado A (eds) Participatory constitutional change: the people as amenders of the constitution. Routledge, New York
Google Scholar
Feldman N (2020) Arab winter: a tragedy. Princeton University Press, Princeton
CrossRef Google Scholar
Fishkin JS, Mansbridge J (2017) Introduction. Dædalus 146(3):6
Google Scholar
Fontaine AS (2020) Where is the new constitution? – a nation still waits for Iceland 2.0. Reykjavik Grapevine, 9 November 2020. https://grapevine.is/mag/feature/2020/11/09/where-is-the-new-constitution/
Freedom House (2019) Freedom on the Net 2019. Ecuador. https://freedomhouse.org/country/ecuador/freedom-net/2019#:~:text=Ecuador's%20Constitution%20guarantees%20%E2%80%9Cuniversal%20access,of%20expression%20(Article%20384)
Funke M, Schularick M, Trebesch C (2016) Going to extremes: politics after financial crises, 1870–2014. Eur Econ Rev 88(C):227–260
CrossRef Google Scholar
Gardbaum S (2003) The “horizontal effect” of constitutional rights. Mich Law Rev 102(3):387–459
CrossRef Google Scholar
Ghosh D (2019) Don’t break up Facebook — treat it like a utility. Harv Bus Rev, 30 May 2019, https://hbr.org/2019/05/dont-break-up-facebook-treat-it-like-a-utility
Gunnarsson BL (2019) Speech at Althing 24 October 2019, transcript. https://www.althingi.is/skodalid.php?lthing=150&lidur=lid20191024T134250
Gylfason T, Meuwese A (2017) Digital tools and the derailment of Iceland’s new constitution. In: Prins C et al (eds) Digital democracy in a globalized world. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, pp 249–274
CrossRef Google Scholar
Hagstofa Íslands (2010) Notkun heimila og einstaklinga á tölvum og neti 2010. https://hagstofa.is/utgafur/utgafa/visindi-og-taekni/notkun-heimila-og-einstaklinga-a-tolvum-og-neti-2010/
Helgadóttir R (2014) Lessons Concerning Constitutional Borrowing from the Icelandic Draft Constitution 2011. In: The IXth World Congress of Constitutional Law: “Constitutional Challenges: Global and Local” Oslo 16–20 June 2014. https://www.jus.uio.no/english/research/news-and-events/events/conferences/2014/wccl-cmdc/wccl/papers/workshop5.html
Hofverberg E (2021) Facebook’s New “Supreme Court” – The Oversight Board and International Human Rights Law. In Custodia Legis Blog, 16 March 2021, https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2021/03/facebooks-new-supreme-court-the-oversight-board-and-international-human-rights-law/
House of the Oireachtas (2008) Joint Committee on the Constitution. First Report. Article 40.6.1.i – Freedom of Expression, July 2008, http://opac.oireachtas.ie/Data/Library3/Library2/DL043973.pdf
Humanist Association of Ireland (2014) Removal of Blasphemy Offence, http://www.constitutionalconvention.ie/AttachmentDownload.ashx?aid=767465d8-802a-e311-96d5-005056a32ee4
IMF (2018) World Economic Outlook, October 2018
Google Scholar
Jefferson T (1789) To James Madison from Thomas Jefferson, 6 September 1789. Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-12-02-0248
Kaminski M, Massaro TM, Norton H (2017) SIRI-OUSLY 2.0: what artificial intelligence reveals about the first amendment. Minn Law Rev 101(6):2481–2525
Google Scholar
Kierulf A (2018) Judicial review in Norway: a bicentennial debate. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
CrossRef Google Scholar
Landemore H (2014) Inclusive constitution-making: the Icelandic experiment. J Polit Philosophy 23(2):166–191
CrossRef Google Scholar
Lansberg-Rodriguez D (2010) Wiki-constitutionalism. The strange phenomenon that’s destroying Latin America. The New Republic, 25 May 2010
Google Scholar
Lenihan B, Honohan P (2010) Letter of Intent from Brian Lenihan, Ireland’s Minister for Finance and Patrick Honohan, Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland, to the International Monetary Fund, 3 Dec. 2010), http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2010/irl/120310.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9EQ-Y998]
Lessig L (2016) On Iceland’s Crowdsourced Constitution. https://medium.com/equal-citizens/on-icelands-crowdsourced-constitution-ad99aae75fce
Massaro TM, Norton H (2016) Siri-ously? Free speech rights and artificial intelligence. Northwest Univ Law Rev 110(5):1169–1194
Google Scholar
Massaro TM, Norton H (2021) Free speech and democracy: a primer for twenty-first century reformers. UC Davis Law Rev 54(3):1631–1685
Google Scholar
Menneskerettighetsutvalget [Human Rights Committee] (2011) Rapport fra Menneskerettighetsutvalget om menneskerettigheter i Grunnloven, avgitt 19. desember 2011 https://stortinget.no/globalassets/pdf/dokumentserien/2011-2012/dok16-201112.pdf
Merton RK (1936) The unanticipated consequences of purposive social action. Am Sociol Rev 1(6):894–904
CrossRef Google Scholar
Meuwese A (2013) Popular constitution-making, the case of Iceland. In: Galligan DJ, Versteeg M (eds) Social and political foundations of constitutions. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 469–496
CrossRef Google Scholar
Ministry of Culture (2020) Mandate for the Freedom of Expression Commission. https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/culture-sports-and-non-profit-work/innsiktsartikler/ytringsfrihetskommisjonen/mandate-for-the-freedom-of-expression-commission/id2695703/
NOU (1999) “Ytringsfrihed bør finde Sted”: forslag til ny grunnlov § 100, NOU 1999:27. Statens Forvaltningstjeneste, Statens Trykning, Oslo
Google Scholar
O’Mahony C (2012) This so-called constitutional convention is a charade. Irish Times, 7 June 2012
Google Scholar
Oddsson D, Mathiesen ÁM (2008) Letter of intent from Davíd Oddsson, chairman of the central Bank of Iceland, and Árni M. Mathiesen, Iceland’s Minister of Finance, to Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing
Google Scholar
Persily N, Tucker JA (2020) Social media and democracy. The state of the field, prospects for reform. Cambridge University Press, New York
Google Scholar
Public Submissions to the Convention on the Constitution (2014), http://www.constitutionalconvention.ie/Submissions.aspx
Redeker D, Gill L, Gasser U (2018) Towards digital constitutionalism? Mapping attempts to craft an internet bill of rights. Int Commun Gazette 80(4):302–319
CrossRef Google Scholar
Referendum Commission (2019) Report on the referendum on blasphemy, February 2019, https://www.refcom.ie/previous-referendums/referendum-on-blasphemy/Report-on-the-referendum-on-blasphemy.pdf
Sajó A (2005) Constitution without the constitutional moment: a view from the new member states. Int J Const Law 3(2–3):243–261
Google Scholar
Schauer F (1983) Free speech and the argument from democracy. Nomos 25:241
Google Scholar
Scheppele KL (2008) A constitution between past and future. William & Mary Law Rev 49(4):1377
Google Scholar
Sérfræðingahópur (2012) Skilabréf sérfræðingahóps um tillögur stjórnlagaráðs að nýrri stjórnarskrá, 12 November 2012, https://www.althingi.is/pdf/skilabref_fylgiskjol.pdf
Skach C (2005) Borrowing constitutional designs. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Google Scholar
Stjórnlagaráð [Constitutional Council] (2011a) Frumvarp til stjórnarskipunarlaga ásamt skýringum [Constitutional proposal with explanatory notes], http://www.stjornlagarad.is/other_files/stjornlagarad/Frumvarp_med_skyringum.pdf
Stjórnlagaráð [Constitutional Council] (2011b) Stjórnlagaráðstíðindi 2 – Umræður á ráðsfundum, 14.-19. ráðsfundur [Transcripts of discussions at plenary sessions 14–19], http://www.stjornlagarad.is/other_files/stjornlagarad/stjornlagaradstidindi2b.pdf
Suteu S (2015) Constitutional conventions in the digital era: lessons from Iceland and Ireland. Boston College Int Comp Law Rev 38(1):267
Google Scholar
Suzor N (2018) Digital constitutionalism: using the rule of law to evaluate the legitimacy of governance by platforms. Soc Media Soc 4:205630511878781. https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305118787812
CrossRef Google Scholar
Suzor N (2020) A constitutional moment: how we might reimagine platform governance. Comput Law Secur Rev 36:105381. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2019.105381
CrossRef Google Scholar
The Associated Press (2019) Facebook blocks page of ex-Ecuadorian leader Rafael Correa. ABC News. https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/facebook-blocks-page-ecuadorian-leader-rafael-correa-62369883
The Convention on the Constitution (2014) Sixth Report. The Removal of the offence of blasphemy from the Constitution, January 2014, http://www.constitutionalconvention.ie/AttachmentDownload.ashx?mid=687a658f-b2a2-e311-a7ce-005056a32ee4
The Federalist Papers: No. 49 (1788) Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed49.asp
The Guardian (2015) Ecuador’s president wages social media counterattack aimed at ‘defamers’ https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/02/ecuador-president-social-media-counterattack
Þórhallsson P (2011a) Minnisblað til stjórnlagaráðs, 20 May 2011, http://www.stjornlagarad.is/servlet/file/Pall_umsogn.pdf?ITEM_ENT_ID=34723&ITEM_VERSION=1&COLLSPEC_ENT_ID=127
Þórhallsson P (2011b) Minnisblað til stjórnlagaráðs, 11 July 2011, http://www.stjornlagarad.is/servlet/file/Pall_umsogn_02.pdf?ITEM_ENT_ID=34775&ITEM_VERSION=1&COLLSPEC_ENT_ID=127
Tooze A (2018) Crashed: how a decade of financial crises changed the world. Penguin Books, London
Google Scholar
Tushnet M (1996) Defending the indeterminacy thesis. Quinnipiac Law Rev 16(2):339–356
Google Scholar
Tushnet M (2008) Some skepticism about normative constitutional advice. William & Mary Law Rev 49(4):1473–1495
Google Scholar
Tushnet M (2016) New institutional mechanisms for making constitutional law. In: Bustamante T, Gonçalves Fernandes B (eds) Democratizing constitutional law. Springer, Cham, pp 167–183
CrossRef Google Scholar
Tushnet M (2021) The Kids are Alright: The Law of Free Expression and New Information Technologies. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3714415
UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression (2011) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, A/HRC/17/27, 16 May 2011
Google Scholar
Venice Commission (2012) Opinion on the Draft New Constitution of Iceland Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 94th Plenary Session (Venice, 8–9 March 2013)
Google Scholar
Venice Commission (2017) Georgia - Opinion on the draft revised Constitution as adopted by the Parliament of Georgia at the second reading on 23 June 2017, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 112th Plenary Session (Venice, 6–7 October 2017)
Google Scholar
Wikipedia (2021) The 2010–2013 Icelandic constitutional reform, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010%E2%80%932013_Icelandic_constitutional_reform#The_assembly's_proposals
Wu T (2018) Is the first amendment obsolete? Mich Law Rev 117(3):547–581
CrossRef Google Scholar
Ytringsfrihetskommisjonen (2021). https://www.ykom.no/

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Faculty of Law, University of Iceland, Reykjavík, Iceland
Kári Hólmar Ragnarsson

Authors

Kári Hólmar Ragnarsson
View author publications
You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Kári Hólmar Ragnarsson .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden
Prof. Dr. Steffen Hindelang
University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden
Assoc. Prof. Andreas Moberg

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

Copyright information

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Ragnarsson, K.H. (2022). Internet Platforms and Freedom of Expression in Constitution-Making. In: Hindelang, S., Moberg, A. (eds) YSEC Yearbook of Socio-Economic Constitutions 2021. YSEC Yearbook of Socio-Economic Constitutions, vol 2021. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/16495_2021_37

Download citation

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/16495_2021_37
Published: 10 April 2022
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-08513-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-031-08514-7
eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)