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Building Surveillance State in a Digital Age and What Export Control Can(Not) Do About It?

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Part of the YSEC Yearbook of Socio-Economic Constitutions book series (YSEC,volume 2021)

Abstract

Globalization leads to technology diffusion, which is inevitably linked to the selling of sensitive surveillance technologies. States and the private sector are close collaborators in the market for digital surveillance tools, which are a part of a new generation of disruptive technologies. As new technologies filter information, they have the potential to limit the freedom of speech or violate the right to privacy. As such, new means to mitigate their misuse and proliferation, including instruments outside of the box of traditional export control regimes, should be considered. This chapter explains the role of surveillance technologies and their effects in suppressing the right to privacy and the freedom of speech in a digital age. Next, it identifies current legal regimes of export control and its limits under the Wassenaar Arrangement. In this context, it also considers the latest EU development when it comes to the Dual-Use Export Regulation, as well as business due diligence. Further, it turns to private self-regulation and the need to comply with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and calls for more standard setting built on their principles.

This contribution was supported by the Charles University, project UNCE—Human Rights Research Centre, UNCE/HUM/011. The opinions expressed in this article do not represent an official position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic and are just and only the author’s. I would like to thank Jan Kunstýř and Milan Lipovský for valuable comments on initial drafts.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Council of Europe, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (2015), p. 1.

  2. 2.

    Amnesty International (2020) and Khalil (2020).

  3. 3.

    European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy Department (2012), pp. 9–10.

  4. 4.

    In general, surveillance can be defined as watching over someone/something, but within the context of privacy, it means interference within another person’s private sphere by observance of his/her activities.

  5. 5.

    Wagner (2012).

  6. 6.

    Caponetti (2016), p. 70.

  7. 7.

    Human Rights Council (2019), para 66a.

  8. 8.

    See e.g. Ezell and Foote (2019).

  9. 9.

    Or, put it differently, “export control history regarding ICT is better read against the pairs between security and commerce, foreign policy and trade policy […]”. Ruohonen and Kimppa (2019), p. 171.

  10. 10.

    The Wall Street Journal reported in 2011 that “a retail market for surveillance tools has sprung up from nearly zero in 200 to about $5 billion a year”. Valentino-DeVries et al. (2011).

  11. 11.

    Kanetake (2019), p. 15.

  12. 12.

    Wagner (2012), p. 7.

  13. 13.

    Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2017).

  14. 14.

    Human Rights Council (2015), paras 16–18.

  15. 15.

    Human Rights Council (2019), para 21.

  16. 16.

    OSCE (2017), section 3. See also Human Rights Committee (2011), paras 18, 40.

  17. 17.

    Human Rights Committee (2004), para 8.

  18. 18.

    Human Rights Council (2011b), principle 3.

  19. 19.

    Kanetake (2019), p. 12.

  20. 20.

    Human Rights Committee (2017), paras 36–37.

  21. 21.

    Privacy International (2014).

  22. 22.

    Wagner (2012), p. 12.

  23. 23.

    US Department of State (2020a, b), p. 4.

  24. 24.

    Sherman and Morgus (2018). However, the situation is changing as particularly China has become a major worldwide supplier of artificial intelligence surveillance technology, such as facial recognition systems, smart city platforms, and smart policing technology—a global driver of “authoritarian tech”. Feldstein (2019), p. 13. Chinese companies have supplied critical technological infrastructure to countries around the world, exporting their authoritarian standards in the process. The “Freedom on the Net 2018” report identified eighteen countries out of 65 that had accessed AI surveillance technology developed by Chinese companies. Shabhaz (2018), pp. 7–8; for further details, see records and witness experts on China’s digital authoritarianism. US House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (2019). In addition, trade exchange in surveillance technologies and equipment is increasingly two-way. For instance, in February 2021, it was revealed that at least half of London’s 32 boroughs have bought and deployed China-made surveillance systems. Asher-Schapiro (2021).

  25. 25.

    U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (2021).

  26. 26.

    Charatsis (2017), p. 53.

  27. 27.

    Pyetranker (2015), p. 162.

  28. 28.

    Reiser and Hindin (2014), p. 29.

  29. 29.

    Wassenaar Arrangement, List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List, WA-LIST (12) 1, 12 December 2012, Category 5.A.1.f.

  30. 30.

    Wassenaar Arrangement, List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List, WA-LIST (13) 1, 4 December 2013, Categories 4.A.5 and 5.A1.j.

  31. 31.

    Bohnenberger (2017), pp. 84–85.

  32. 32.

    Dullien et al. (2016) and Sergey Bratus et al. (2014).

  33. 33.

    Ruohonen and Kimppa (2019), p. 184.

  34. 34.

    Pyetranker (2015), p. 168.

  35. 35.

    Human Rights Council (2019), para 34.

  36. 36.

    Bohnenberger (2017), p. 84.

  37. 37.

    Thomsen and Thomsen (2015), p. 32; Pyetranker (2015), p. 174.

  38. 38.

    Thomson (2016).

  39. 39.

    Charatsis (2017), p. 56.

  40. 40.

    Charatsis (2017), p. 67.

  41. 41.

    There were evidenced several examples when cyber-surveillance technology exported by EU companies was afterwards used by autocratic regimes to suppress dissent and resistance while massively violating human rights.

  42. 42.

    Ecorys and SIPRI (2015).

  43. 43.

    Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009.

  44. 44.

    European Commission (2014a).

  45. 45.

    Krahulcova (2017).

  46. 46.

    European Parliament (2015); European Parliament (2016), para 21.

  47. 47.

    Council of the EU (2015b), para 24.

  48. 48.

    European Commission (2016).

  49. 49.

    Kanetake (2019), p. 7.

  50. 50.

    Council of the EU (2018).

  51. 51.

    DIGITAL EUROPE (2018).

  52. 52.

    Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (2016), p. 7. For more details see also Bohnenberger (2017), pp. 98–99.

  53. 53.

    Gregorová (2020).

  54. 54.

    All the EU needs to do is regulate the single market; it is the global corporations that transmit EU rules across the global marketplace, as the above examples illustrate. This dynamic allows the EU to exert a passive but deep influence on corporate behaviour, transforming global markets in the process.

  55. 55.

    See e.g. recently adopted the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act. There is also a broader global contest for influence over the global norms governing the digital economy. While the U.S. and the EU have their disagreements, they seem manageable when compared to their shared concern over China’s or Russia’s authoritarian approaches. Contesting views on cyber norms are already taking place in the United Nations. See e.g. Polyakova and Meserole (2019), p. 11; Ding (2020); Grigsby (2018).

  56. 56.

    European Commission (2020), pp. 5–7.

  57. 57.

    Ruggie and Nelson (2015), pp. 170–171; Svoboda (2018), p. 50.

  58. 58.

    Privacy International (2013).

  59. 59.

    UK National Contact Point (2013), para 25.

  60. 60.

    UK National Contact Point (2014), paras 68–69.

  61. 61.

    UK National Contact Point (2016), para 9.

  62. 62.

    FIDH - International Federation for Human Rights (2014), pp. 26–27.

  63. 63.

    Society for Threatened Peoples (2020).

  64. 64.

    Svoboda (2021).

  65. 65.

    See also Bromley et al. (2016), p. 48.

  66. 66.

    For instance, the still novel French Duty of Vigilance Law (2017) requires companies of a certain size to create and implement annual vigilance plans in order to assess and address the risks of human rights, health and safety, and environmental violations resulting from their activities, including those of their business relationships. The Finnish government announced in its official programme plans to make compulsory conduct human rights assessment for companies, while the German government proposed to establish due diligence processes within the National Action Plan on business and human rights and possibly binding legislation later.

  67. 67.

    Fox (2020).

  68. 68.

    European Parliament (2021).

  69. 69.

    European Parliament (2021), Art. 4.1.

  70. 70.

    Council of the EU (2020), para 45.

  71. 71.

    Council of the EU (2015a), Objective 18.

  72. 72.

    Newman and Bach (2014), p. 430.

  73. 73.

    OECD (2016); Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas. The other field concerns foreign investors’ behaviour. See e.g. Svoboda (2020), pp. 462–474.

  74. 74.

    US Department of State (2020a, b).

  75. 75.

    More specifically, the US agencies issued the Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory statement in July 2020 in which they call for “businesses and individuals should examine the end users of their products, technology, research, and services, to reduce the likelihood that their goods or services are being used to build, maintain, or support: […] (2) the broader surveillance apparatus of the PRC government; […].” US Department of State (2020a, b), p. 8.

  76. 76.

    Anstis et al. (2020).

  77. 77.

    Aryobsei and Scherb (2020).

  78. 78.

    Human Rights Council (2018), para 10.

  79. 79.

    Guiding Principles, principle 11.

  80. 80.

    European Commission (2014b).

  81. 81.

    Cohn and York (2011).

  82. 82.

    TechUK (2014).

  83. 83.

    Human Rights Council (2019), para 32.

  84. 84.

    Human Rights Council (2011a), paras 15–25.

  85. 85.

    Maurer (2016).

  86. 86.

    See also Global Conference on Cyberspace 2015, Chair’s Statement (2015).

  87. 87.

    Privacy International (2014).

  88. 88.

    Human Rights Council (2019), p. 18.

  89. 89.

    Lipovský (2016), p. 264.

  90. 90.

    See, e.g., Polyakova and Meserole (2019); Khalil (2020).

  91. 91.

    UN Internet Governance Forum (2014). See also the OHCHR webpage on the B-Tech Project for the full list of materials.

  92. 92.

    Human Rights Council (2019), para 34.

  93. 93.

    Bauer and Bromley (2019).

  94. 94.

    OECD (2020a, b), pp. 5–6.

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Svoboda, O. (2022). Building Surveillance State in a Digital Age and What Export Control Can(Not) Do About It?. In: Hindelang, S., Moberg, A. (eds) YSEC Yearbook of Socio-Economic Constitutions 2021. YSEC Yearbook of Socio-Economic Constitutions, vol 2021. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/16495_2021_35

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/16495_2021_35

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