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Football’s Bad Governance in the Dock: The Court of Arbitration for Sport and FIFA’s Policing of Football Officials

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Yearbook of International Sports Arbitration 2018–2020

Part of the book series: Yearbook of International Sports Arbitration ((YISA))

Abstract

The Fédération Internationale de Football Association, better known as FIFA, has been through turbulent times in recent years. The infamous pictures of early morning arrests in a luxurious Zurich Hotel in May 2015 are still in people’s mind and Sepp Blatter’s tenure at the helm of the organization is forever tainted by the decimation of FIFA’s Executive Committee (reborn since then as FIFA Council) by the United States Department of Justice. This chapter aims to take a look at how the CAS has dealt with FIFA’s attempts at policing the misbehaviour of its administrators and those of its affiliates. Since 2010, we have witnessed a growing wave of inquiries being launched and sanctions being issued by FIFA against football administrators for failing to comply with its FIFA Code of Ethics (FCE). In turn, this activation of FIFA’s internal policing capacity led almost mechanically to an increasing number of challenges at the CAS, which is the sole competent judicial authority to review FIFA’s decisions. The holdings of the CAS in these cases have a crucial impact on the scope and modalities of FIFA’s investigations and disciplinary processes by defining their procedural and substantial boundaries. This chapter aims to provide a first overview of the (publicly available) CAS awards involving the review of FIFA decisions grounded in the FCE and focused on governance matters.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a journalistic account, see Conn (2017), Blake and Calvert (2015). For an academic account, see Sugden and Tomlinson (2017); and for a recent review of a range of books covering these turbulences, see Gill et al. (2019).

  2. 2.

    Tomlinson (2014), p. 1155.

  3. 3.

    See Michael S. Schmidt and Sam Borden, In a Five-Star Setting, FIFA Officials Are Arrested, the Swiss Way, New York Times, 27 May 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/28/sports/soccer/in-a-five-star-setting-fifa-officials-are-arrested-the-swiss-way.html. Accessed 1 July 2022. And U.S. Department of Justice, Nine FIFA Officials and Five Corporate Executives Indicted for Racketeering Conspiracy and Corruption, 27 May 2015, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nine-fifa-officials-and-five-corporate-executives-indicted-racketeering-conspiracy-and. Accessed 1 July 2022.

  4. 4.

    Jennings (2006, 2016).

  5. 5.

    Hough and Heaston (2018), p. 332.

  6. 6.

    Gill et al. (2019), p. 1046.

  7. 7.

    See Tomlinson (2014), p. 1159. Similarly, Hough and Heaston (2018), p. 332.

  8. 8.

    Pieth (2018), p. 172.

  9. 9.

    Heaston et al. (2020), p. 404.

  10. 10.

    For a sociological reconstruction of the scandalization process that led to FIFA’s crisis in 2015, see Bayle and Rayner (2018), pp. 593–611.

  11. 11.

    Hough and Heaston (2018).

  12. 12.

    For a very critical perspective by former insiders, see Navi Pillay, Miguel Poiares Maduro and Joseph Weiler, ‘Our Sin? We Appeared to Take Our Task at FIFA Too Seriously’, 21 December 2017, available at www.theguardian.com/football/2017/dec/21/our-sin-take-task-fifa-seriously. Accessed 1 July 2022. For other sceptical assessments of the reforms, see Bean (2017), Hough and Heaston (2018), p. 339 [‘FIFA’s reform process is better understood as a series of false dawns, in which high expectations have not been met and promising developments have ultimately petered out.’].

  13. 13.

    See Bayle and Rayner (2018), p. 607 [‘The ultimate lesson to be learnt from FIFAgate is that the involvement of one or more powerful institutions (in this case, the US DoJ and FBI) is a necessary but insufficient condition for a scandal to occur […]’].

  14. 14.

    As identified by Emmanuel Bayle, the scandal was indeed to be used as a “springboard” for change, but instead of reforms this change consisted mainly in activating a more or less sleeping institution, the Ethics Committee. See Bayle (2020), p. 623.

  15. 15.

    For a quantification of this trend, see below Sect. 2.4.

  16. 16.

    CAS 2016/A/4501 Joseph S. Blatter v. FIFA, Award of 5 December 2016; CAS 2017/A/5086 Mong Joon Chung v. FIFA, Award of 9 February 2018; CAS 2019/A/6219 Sidio José Mugadza v. FIFA, Award of 27 March 2020; CAS 2018/A/6072 Kwesi Nyantakyi v. FIFA, Award of 9 April 2020; CAS 2019/A/6220 Boniface Mwamelo v. FIFA, Award of 7 July 2020; CAS 2019/A/6388 Karim Keramuddin v. FIFA, Award of 14 July 2020; CAS 2019/A/6677 Markus Kattner v. FIFA, Award of 13 July 2020; CAS 2019/A/6326 Chabour Goc Alei v. FIFA, Award of 16 July 2020; TAS 2020/A/7371 Yves Jean-Bart c. FIFA, Award of 19 November 2020; TAS 2020/A/6709 Ariel Alberto Alvarado Carrasco c. FIFA, Award of 29 January 2021; CAS 2019/A/6489 Juan Angel Napout v. FIFA, Award of 2 June 2021; CAS 2019/A/6439 Samson Siasia v. FIFA, Award of 21 June 2021; CAS 2019/A/6344 Marco Polo Del Nero v. FIFA, Award of 31 August 2021, TAS 2020/A/7592 Ahmad Ahmad c. FIFA, Award of 5 October 2021; CAS 2020/A/7388 Manuel Irenio Lopes Nascimento v. FIFA, Award of 29 October 2021; CAS 2021/A/8256 Issa Hayatou v. FIFA, Award of 4 February 2022; CAS 2020/A/6617 Manuel Burga Seoane v. FIFA, Award of 5 April 2022; CAS 2019/A/6669 Sayed Ali Reza Aghazada v. FIFA, Award of 28 April 2022.

  17. 17.

    I have looked only at the awards publicly available before 1 July 2021. Accordingly, the following recent decisions have not been considered in the analysis: CAS 2019/A/6489 Juan Angel Napout v. FIFA, Award of 2 June 2021; CAS 2019/A/6344 Marco Polo Del Nero v. FIFA, Award of 31 August 2021; TAS 2020/A/7592 Ahmad Ahmad c. FIFA, Award of 5 October 2021; CAS 2020/A/7388 Manuel Irenio Lopes Nascimento v. FIFA, Award of 29 October 2021; CAS 2021/A/8256 Issa Hayatou v. FIFA, Award of 4 February 2022; CAS 2020/A/6617 Manuel Burga Seoane v. FIFA, Award of 5 April 2022. I have also excluded from the scope of this article cases related to match-fixing (CAS 2019/A/6219 Sidio José Mugadza v. FIFA, Award of 27 March 2020; CAS/2019/A/6439 Samson Siasia v. FIFA, Award of 21 June 2021; CAS 2019/A/6220 Boniface Mwamelo v. FIFA, Award of 7 July 2020) and to sexual abuses (CAS 2019/A/6388 Karim Keramuddin v. FIFA, Award of 14 July 2020; TAS 2020/A/7371 Yves Jean-Bart c. FIFA, Award of 19 November 2020; CAS 2019/A/6669 Sayed Ali Reza Aghazada v. FIFA, Award of 28 April 2022).

  18. 18.

    Heaston et al. (2020), p. 417.

  19. 19.

    For a historical analysis of FIFA’s evolution under Havelange’s tenure, see Eisenberg (2006), pp. 55–68.

  20. 20.

    For more details on the scandal, see Andrew Jennings, Bribes, ethics and the end of an era at FIFA, 7 November 2007, https://www.sportsjournalists.co.uk/journalism-news/isl-ethics-and-the-end-of-an-era-at-fifa/. Accessed 1 July 2022; BBC, Panorama: Three Fifa World Cup officials took bribes, 29 November 2010, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-11841783. Accessed 1 July 2022.

  21. 21.

    On the IOC’s governance reforms following the Salt Lake City corruption scandal, see Skinner (2008), p. 421, and Chappelet (2011), p. 319.

  22. 22.

    Jakob Staun, FIFA’s transparency offensive, 2 June 2006, https://www.playthegame.org/news/news-articles/2006/fifas-transparency-offensive/. Accessed 1 July 2022.

  23. 23.

    FCE 2004, available at https://digitalhub.fifa.com/m/3cc86ac62e2bb0e/original/uarys8yetmqpnwpogme7-pdf.pdf. Accessed 1 July 2022.

  24. 24.

    The infamous FIFA ExCo member, Jack Warner, was reportedly found to have breached the FCE by the FIFA Committee for Ethics and Fair Play; however, he mysteriously evaded a sanction. See Nick Harris, Warner guilty of Fifa ethics breach, The Independent, 17 February 2006, https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/news/warner-guilty-of-fifa-ethics-breach-6108857.html. Accessed 1 July 2022, and Andrew Jennings, Bribes, ethics and the end of an era at Fifa, 7 November 2007, https://www.sportsjournalists.co.uk/journalism-news/isl-ethics-and-the-end-of-an-era-at-fifa/. Accessed 1 July 2022.

  25. 25.

    Andrew Jennings, Bribes, ethics and the end of an era at FIFA, 7 November 2007, https://www.sportsjournalists.co.uk/journalism-news/isl-ethics-and-the-end-of-an-era-at-fifa/. Accessed 1 July 2022.

  26. 26.

    Tomlinson (2014), p. 1161.

  27. 27.

    Article 5 FIFA Code of Ethics—Procedural Regulations 2006.

  28. 28.

    See Footnote 28.

  29. 29.

    Article 7 FIFA Code of Ethics—Procedural Regulations 2006.

  30. 30.

    Article 56 of the FIFA Statutes 2006.

  31. 31.

    Its first decision was apparently passed in 2007 and related to irregularities in the selection of Kenyan referees and assistant referees for the 2007 FIFA List of International Referees, see FIFA Activity Report 2008, p.17.

  32. 32.

    None in 2007/2008 and only one in 2009, see FIFA Activity Report 2008, p. 110 and FIFA Activity Report 2009, p. 109.

  33. 33.

    Especially around the attribution of the 2022 World Cup, see Blake and Calvert (2015). For the news coverage at the time, see Rob Hughes, Votes Up for Bid, and FIFA’s on the Clock, New York Times, 19 October 2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/20/sports/soccer/20onsoccer.html. Accessed 1 July 2022.

  34. 34.

    FIFA Activity Report 2011, p. 119.

  35. 35.

    Heaston et al. (2020), p. 409.

  36. 36.

    FIFA Circular no. 1314.

  37. 37.

    For an overview of the work done by the Independent Governance committee and of its influence on these reforms, see the Final Report by the Independent Governance Committee to the Executive Committee of FIFA, 22 April 2014, available at https://baselgovernance.org/sites/default/files/2019-01/final_report_by_igc_to_fifa_exco_en.pdf. Accessed 1 July 2022. For a critical assessment of the reforms, see Pielke (2014).

  38. 38.

    FIFA Circular no. 1507.

  39. 39.

    FIFA Circular no. 1645.

  40. 40.

    FIFA Circular no. 1683.

  41. 41.

    FIFA Governance Report 2016, p. 21.

  42. 42.

    FIFA Disciplinary and Ethics Report 2020/2021.

  43. 43.

    FIFA Disciplinary and Ethics Report 2020/2021, p. 12.

  44. 44.

    FIFA Activity Report 2011, p. 16.

  45. 45.

    FIFA Disciplinary and Ethics Report 2020/2021, p.13.

  46. 46.

    Ibid., p. 13.

  47. 47.

    Ibid., p. 17.

  48. 48.

    FIFA Disciplinary and Ethics Report 2019/2020.

  49. 49.

    FIFA Governance Report 2016.

  50. 50.

    Costing USD 2,2 Million in 2016 and USD 1,43 Million in 2017, see FIFA Governance Report 2017, p. 52 and FIFA Governance Report 2018, p. 62.

  51. 51.

    Article 57 FIFA Statute 2022.

  52. 52.

    See the cases listed in Footnote 17.

  53. 53.

    CAS 2014/A/3537 Vernon Manilal Fernando v. FIFA, Award of 30 March 2015, para 87.

  54. 54.

    CAS 2017/A/5003 Jérôme Valcke v. FIFA, Award of 27 July 2018, para 265.

  55. 55.

    CAS 2017/A/5086 Mong Joon Chung v. FIFA, Award of 9 February 2018, para 189.

  56. 56.

    CAS 2017/A/5003 Jérôme Valcke v. FIFA, Award of 27 July 2018, para 253.

  57. 57.

    Ibid., para 254.

  58. 58.

    Ibid., para 265.

  59. 59.

    Ibid.

  60. 60.

    Ibid.

  61. 61.

    Ibid., para 269.

  62. 62.

    CAS 2017/A/5086 Mong Joon Chung v. FIFA, Award of 9 February 2018, paras 196–199.

  63. 63.

    Ibid., para 196.

  64. 64.

    Ibid., para 197.

  65. 65.

    Ibid., paras 200–205.

  66. 66.

    Ibid., para 203.

  67. 67.

    Ibid., para 204.

  68. 68.

    CAS 2018/A/5769 Worawi Makudi v. FIFA, Award of 11 February 2019, paras 129–136. See also CAS 2017/A/5086 Mong Joon Chung v. FIFA, Award of 9 February 2018, paras 193–195.

  69. 69.

    CAS 2017/A/5003 70 Jérôme Valcke v. FIFA, Award of 27 July 2018, para 147.

  70. 70.

    Ibid., para 147.

  71. 71.

    Ibid., para 148.

  72. 72.

    Ibid., para 150.

  73. 73.

    TAS 2016/A/4474 Michel Platini c. FIFA, paras 148–178; CAS 2016/A/4501 Joseph S. Blatter v. FIFA, Award of 5 December 2016, paras 91–96; CAS 2017/A/5006 Harold Mayne-Nicholls v. FIFA, Award of 14 July 2017, paras 181–196; CAS 2018/A/6038 Osiris Guzmán v. FIFA, Award of 23 September 2019, paras 65–75; CAS 2019/A/6326 Chabour Goc Alei v. FIFA, Award of 16 July 2020, paras 161–172.

  74. 74.

    CAS 2011/A/2426 Amos Adamu v. FIFA, Award of 24 February 2012, para 60. It is still recognized in recent awards, see CAS 2018/A/6072 Kwesi Nyantakyi v. FIFA, Award of 9 April 2020, para 49.

  75. 75.

    CAS 2014/A/3537 Vernon Manilal Fernando v. FIFA, Award of 30 March 2015, para 77.

  76. 76.

    CAS 2018/A/6072 Kwesi Nyantakyi v. FIFA, Award of 9 April 2020, para 49.

  77. 77.

    TAS 2016/A/4474 Michel Platini c. FIFA, paras 148–178; CAS 2016/A/4501 Joseph S. Blatter v. FIFA, Award of 5 December 2016, paras 91–96; CAS 2017/A/5006 Harold Mayne-Nicholls v. FIFA, Award of 14 July 2017, paras 181–196; CAS 2018/A/6038 Osiris Guzmán v. FIFA, Award of 23 September 2019, paras 65–75; Chabour Goc Alei v. FIFA, Award of 16 July 2020, paras 161–172.

  78. 78.

    CAS 2017/A/5006 Harold Mayne-Nicholls v. FIFA, Award of 14 July 2017, para 181–192.

  79. 79.

    TAS 2016/A/4474 Michel Platini c. FIFA, paras 151–170.

  80. 80.

    CAS 2017/A/5003 Jérôme Valcke v. FIFA, Award of 27 July 2018, para 142.

  81. 81.

    Ibid., para 142.

  82. 82.

    CAS 2018/A/6038 Osiris Guzmán v. FIFA, Award of 23 September 2019, para 71. For similar interpretation of the equivalence between bribery provisions in the FCEs, see CAS 2019/A/6665 Ricardo Terra Teixeira v. FIFA, para 69.

  83. 83.

    CAS 2018/A/6038 Osiris Guzmán v. FIFA, Award of 23 September 2019, para 74.

  84. 84.

    CAS 2017/A/5006 Harold Mayne-Nicholls v. FIFA, Award of 14 July 2017, para 193.

  85. 85.

    CAS 2011/A/2625 Mohamed Bin Hammam v. FIFA, Award of 19 July 2012, para 39 and CAS 2016/A/4501 Joseph S. Blatter v. FIFA, Award of 5 December 2016, para 113.

  86. 86.

    TAS 2016/A/4474 Michel Platini c. FIFA, para 211.

  87. 87.

    Ibid., para 214.

  88. 88.

    CAS 2019/A/6665 Ricardo Terra Teixeira v. FIFA, para 83. Similarly, CAS 2017/A/5003 Jérôme Valcke v. FIFA, Award of 27 July 2018, para 174.

  89. 89.

    Ibid.

  90. 90.

    CAS 2011/A/2426 Amos Adamu v. FIFA, Award of 24 February 2012, para 87.

  91. 91.

    Ibid.

  92. 92.

    Ibid., para 88.

  93. 93.

    Ibid.

  94. 94.

    Ibid., with reference to CAS 2010/A/2172, para 53; CAS 2009/A/1920, para 85.

  95. 95.

    CAS 2011/A/2625 Mohamed Bin Hammam v. FIFA Award of 19 July 2012, paras 35–38.

  96. 96.

    CAS 2014/A/3537 Vernon Manilal Fernando v. FIFA, Award of 30 March 2015, para 81.

  97. 97.

    Ibid., para 82.

  98. 98.

    CAS 2016/A/4501 Joseph S. Blatter v. FIFA, Award of 5 December 2016, para 122; TAS 2016/A/4474 Michel Platini c. FIFA, paras 219–220; CAS 2019/A/6665 Ricardo Terra Teixeira v. FIFA, para 88.

  99. 99.

    CAS 2017/A/5003 70 Jérôme Valcke v. FIFA, Award of 27 July 2018, para 175.

  100. 100.

    See CAS 2011/A/2426 Amos Adamu v. FIFA, Award of 24 February 2012, para 61 and CAS 2011/A/2425 Ahongalu Fusimalohi v. FIFA, Award of 8 March 2012, paras 16–64.

  101. 101.

    See CAS 2011/A/2426 Amos Adamu v. FIFA, Award of 24 February 2012, para 64.

  102. 102.

    Ibid., para 65.

  103. 103.

    Ibid., para 66.

  104. 104.

    Ibid., para 68.

  105. 105.

    Ibid., para 75.

  106. 106.

    Ibid., para 91.

  107. 107.

    Ibid.

  108. 108.

    Ibid., paras 94–107.

  109. 109.

    Ibid., para 98.

  110. 110.

    Ibid., para 100.

  111. 111.

    Ibid., para 101.

  112. 112.

    Ibid., para 101.

  113. 113.

    Ibid., para 102. See as well CAS 2011/A/2425 Ahongalu Fusimalohi v. FIFA, Award of 8 March 2012, para 58.

  114. 114.

    CAS 2019/A/6665 Ricardo Terra Teixeira v. FIFA, Award of 14 September 2021, para 92. Referring to CAS 2010/A/2266N. & V. v. UEFA, Award of 5 May 2011 and CAS 2016/A/4501 Joseph S. Blatter v. FIFA, Award of 5 December 2016.

  115. 115.

    CAS 2019/A/6665 Ricardo Terra Teixeira v. FIFA, Award of 14 September 2021, para 95.

  116. 116.

    Ibid.

  117. 117.

    Article 13 provides:

    1. Persons bound by this Code shall be aware of the importance of their duties and concomitant obligations and responsibilities. In particular, persons bound by this Code shall fulfil and exercise their duties and responsibilities diligently, especially with regard to finance-related matters.

    2. Persons bound by this Code shall respect FIFA’s regulatory framework to the extent applicable to them.

    3. Persons bound by this Code shall appreciate the impact their conduct may have on FIFA’s reputation, and shall therefore behave in a dignified and ethical manner and act with complete credibility and integrity at all times.

    4. Persons bound by this Code must refrain from any activity or behaviour or any attempted activity or behaviour that might give rise to the appearance or suspicion of improper conduct as described in the sections that follow.

    5.Violation of this article shall be sanctioned with an appropriate fine of at least CHF 10,000 as well as a ban on taking part in any football-related activity for a maximum of two years.

  118. 118.

    Article 15 provides:

    1. Persons bound by this Code shall have a fiduciary duty to FIFA, the confederations, associations, leagues and clubs.

    2. Violation of this article shall be sanctioned with an appropriate fine of at least CHF 10,000 as well as a ban on taking part in any football-related activity for a maximum of two years.

  119. 119.

    CAS 2017/A/5086 Mong Joon Chung v. FIFA, Award of 9 February 2018, para 148.

  120. 120.

    Ibid., para 151.

  121. 121.

    Ibid., para 152.

  122. 122.

    Ibid., para 153.

  123. 123.

    Ibid.

  124. 124.

    Ibid., para 154.

  125. 125.

    CAS 2011/A/2425 Ahongalu Fusimalohi v. FIFA, Award of 8 March 2012, paras 104–113.

  126. 126.

    CAS 2011/A/2426 Amos Adamu v. FIFA, Award of 24 February 2012, para 144.

  127. 127.

    CAS 2011/A/2425 Ahongalu Fusimalohi v. FIFA, Award of 8 March 2012, paras 104–113.

  128. 128.

    Ibid., para 111.

  129. 129.

    CAS 2017/A/5086 Mong Joon Chung v. FIFA, Award of 9 February 2018, para 169.

  130. 130.

    Ibid., para 171.

  131. 131.

    Ibid., para 172.

  132. 132.

    Ibid., para 182–188.

  133. 133.

    Ibid., para 186.

  134. 134.

    CAS 2017/A/5006 Harold Mayne-Nicholls v. FIFA, Award of 14 July 2017, para 207.

  135. 135.

    Ibid.

  136. 136.

    Ibid., para 203.

  137. 137.

    Ibid.

  138. 138.

    Ibid., para 204.

  139. 139.

    For Articles 3 and 9 FCE (edition 2009), see CAS 2016/A/4501 Joseph S. Blatter v. FIFA, Award of 5 December 2016, paras 304–306. For Article 13 and 15 FCE (edition 2012), see TAS 2016/A/4474 Michel Platini c. FIFA, paras 321–341 and CAS 2017/A/5003 Jérôme Valcke v. FIFA, Award of 27 July 2018, paras 195–202.

  140. 140.

    CAS 2011/A/2425 Ahongalu Fusimalohi v. FIFA, Award of 8 March 2012, para 108 and CAS 2017/A/5086 Mong Joon Chung v. FIFA, Award of 9 February 2018, para 179.

  141. 141.

    CAS 2011/A/2425 Ahongalu Fusimalohi v. FIFA, Award of 8 March 2012, para 108.

  142. 142.

    CAS 2017/A/5086 Mong Joon Chung v. FIFA, Award of 9 February 2018, para 178.

  143. 143.

    Ibid., para 179.

  144. 144.

    Ibid.

  145. 145.

    The episode of the expensive watches offered by FIFA in the context of the 2014 World Cup in Brazil is probably the most famous, see Rebecca R. Ruiz, FIFA, Recovering 48 Luxury Watches, Seeks to Cast Off Links to Giveaway, New York Times, 26 November 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/27/sports/soccer/fifa-watches-parmigiani-fleurier.html. Accessed 1 July 2022.

  146. 146.

    Article 6 FCE 2004 provided: “Gifts, particularly gifts in kind and any other benefits, may be accepted only if they are of token value in accordance with the relevant local and cultural customs. Any gifts or benefits that are not of token value shall be submitted to the presiding body for approval. Any gifts not approved shall be handed over to and retained by the relevant organisation. In the absence of a presiding body, the body of which the individual in question is a member shall adjudicate. It is forbidden to accept any gifts of money. Persons bound by this Code shall not be accompanied to official events by family members or any other persons at the expense of FIFA, the Associations or any other organisation, unless the relevant organisation has approved such an arrangement in advance.”

  147. 147.

    Article 20 provides:

    1. Persons bound by this Code may only offer or accept gifts or other benefits to and from persons within or outside FIFA, or in conjunction with intermediaries or related parties as defined in this Code, where such gifts or benefits:

    (a) have symbolic or trivial value;

    (b) are not offered or accepted as a way of influencing persons bound by this Code to execute or omit an act that is related to their official activities or falls within their discretion;

    (c) are not offered or accepted in contravention of the duties of persons bound by this Code;

    (d) do not create any undue pecuniary or other advantage; and

    (e) do not create a conflict of interest.

    Any gifts or other benefits not meeting all of these criteria are prohibited.

    2. If in doubt, gifts or other benefits shall not be accepted, given, offered, promised, received, requested or solicited. In all cases, persons bound by this Code shall not accept, give, offer, promise, receive, request or solicit from anyone within or outside FIFA, or in conjunction with intermediaries or related parties as defined in this Code, cash in any amount or form. If declining the gift or benefit would offend the giver on the grounds of cultural norms, persons bound by this Code may accept the gift or benefit on behalf of their respective organisation and shall report it and hand it over, where applicable, immediately thereafter to the competent body.

    3. Violation of this article shall be sanctioned with an appropriate fine of at least CHF 10,000 as well as a ban on taking part in any football-related activity for a maximum of two years. Any amount unduly received shall be included in the calculation of the fine. In addition to the fine, the gift or benefit unduly received should be returned, if applicable. In serious cases and/or in the case of repetition, a ban on taking part in any football-related activity may be pronounced for a maximum of five years.

  148. 148.

    TAS 2016/A/4474 Michel Platini c. FIFA, paras 233–284; CAS 2017/A/5006 Harold Mayne-Nicholls v. FIFA, Award of 14 July 2017, para 189; CAS 2016/A/4501 Joseph S. Blatter v. FIFA, Award of 5 December 2016, paras 285–287; CAS 2017/A/5003 Jérôme Valcke v. FIFA, Award of 27 July 2018, para 242; CAS 2019/A/6326 Chabour Goc Alei v. FIFA, Award of 16 July 2020, paras 181–195.

  149. 149.

    John Revill, Blatter and Platini face Swiss corruption trial, Reuters, 8 June 2022, https://www.reuters.com/lifestyle/sports/blatter-platini-face-swiss-corruption-trial-2022-06-07/. Accessed 1 July 2022.

  150. 150.

    TAS 2016/A/4474 Michel Platini c. FIFA, paras 233–284.

  151. 151.

    Ibid., para 287.

  152. 152.

    Ibid., paras 292–293.

  153. 153.

    Ibid., para 295.

  154. 154.

    Ibid., para 296.

  155. 155.

    Ibid.

  156. 156.

    Ibid.

  157. 157.

    CAS 2017/A/5006 Harold Mayne-Nicholls v. FIFA, Award of 14 July 2017, para 189.

  158. 158.

    Ibid., para 190.

  159. 159.

    Ibid.

  160. 160.

    Ibid., para 191.

  161. 161.

    Ibid., para 192.

  162. 162.

    Ibid., paras 193–194.

  163. 163.

    CAS 2016/A/4501 Joseph S. Blatter v. FIFA, Award of 5 December 2016, para 216.

  164. 164.

    Ibid., para 217.

  165. 165.

    Ibid.

  166. 166.

    Ibid., para 218.

  167. 167.

    Ibid., para 268.

  168. 168.

    Ibid., para 285–287.

  169. 169.

    CAS 2017/A/5003 Jérôme Valcke v. FIFA, Award of 27 July 2018, para 242.

  170. 170.

    Ibid., para 244.

  171. 171.

    Ibid.

  172. 172.

    Ibid.

  173. 173.

    Ibid.

  174. 174.

    Article 11 FCE 2009 provides:

    1. Officials may not accept bribes; in other words, any gifts or other advantages that are offered, promised or sent to them to incite breach of duty or dishonest conduct for the benefit of a third party shall be refused.

    2. Officials are forbidden from bribing third parties or from urging or inciting others to do so in order to gain an advantage for themselves or third parties.

  175. 175.

    CAS 2011/A/2426 Amos Adamu v. FIFA, Award of 24 February 2012, para 118. See as well, CAS 2011/A/2425 Ahongalu Fusimalohi v. FIFA, Award of 8 March 2012, para 75 and CAS 2019/A/6665 Ricardo Terra Teixeira v. FIFA, Award of 14 September 2021, para 107.

  176. 176.

    CAS 2011/A/2425 Ahongalu Fusimalohi v. FIFA, Award of 8 March 2012, para 74.

  177. 177.

    CAS 2011/A/2426 Amos Adamu v. FIFA, Award of 24 February 2012, para 119.

  178. 178.

    Ibid., para 120.

  179. 179.

    Ibid.

  180. 180.

    Ibid.

  181. 181.

    CAS 2018/A/6038 Osiris Guzmán v. FIFA, Award of 23 September 2019, para 84.

  182. 182.

    Ibid., para 88.

  183. 183.

    CAS 2011/A/2425 Ahongalu Fusimalohi v. FIFA, Award of 8 March 2012, para 76.

  184. 184.

    Ibid., para 82.

  185. 185.

    CAS 2011/A/2426 Amos Adamu v. FIFA, Award of 24 February 2012, para 123 and CAS 2011/A/2425 Ahongalu Fusimalohi v. FIFA, Award of 8 March 2012, para 84.

  186. 186.

    Ibid.

  187. 187.

    Ibid.

  188. 188.

    CAS 2011/A/2425 Ahongalu Fusimalohi v. FIFA, Award of 8 March 2012, para 85.

  189. 189.

    CAS 2011/A/2426 Amos Adamu v. FIFA, Award of 24 February 2012, para 125.

  190. 190.

    See the list provide at CAS 2011/A/2426 Amos Adamu v. FIFA, Award of 24 February 2012, para 126.

  191. 191.

    CAS 2011/A/2425 Ahongalu Fusimalohi v. FIFA, Award of 8 March 2012, para 86.

  192. 192.

    Ibid.

  193. 193.

    Ibid., para 87.

  194. 194.

    Ibid.

  195. 195.

    CAS 2011/A/2426 Amos Adamu v. FIFA, Award of 24 February 2012, para 128 and CAS 2011/A/2425 Ahongalu Fusimalohi v. FIFA, Award of 8 March 2012, para 89.

  196. 196.

    Ibid.

  197. 197.

    Ibid.

  198. 198.

    CAS 2011/A/2426 Amos Adamu v. FIFA, Award of 24 February 2012, para 129 and CAS 2011/A/2425 Ahongalu Fusimalohi v. FIFA, Award of 8 March 2012, para 90.

  199. 199.

    Ibid.

  200. 200.

    CAS 2011/A/2426 Amos Adamu v. FIFA, Award of 24 February 2012, para 129. Similarly, CAS 2011/A/2425 Ahongalu Fusimalohi v. FIFA, Award of 8 March 2012, para 90 [‘In the absence of such flawless, impeccable and transparent behaviour by top football officials, the public at large and football stakeholders will seriously doubt the rectitude and integrity of football organizations as a whole. This public distrust may eventually extend to the authenticity of sporting results and can destroy the essence of the sport.’].

  201. 201.

    CAS 2011/A/2426 Amos Adamu v. FIFA, Award of 24 February 2012, para 130 and CAS 2011/A/2425 Ahongalu Fusimalohi v. FIFA, Award of 8 March 2012, para 91.

  202. 202.

    CAS 2011/A/2426 Amos Adamu v. FIFA, Award of 24 February 2012, para 130.

  203. 203.

    CAS 2011/A/2425 Ahongalu Fusimalohi v. FIFA, Award of 8 March 2012, para 91.

  204. 204.

    CAS 2011/A/2426 Amos Adamu v. FIFA, Award of 24 February 2012, para 131. Similarly, CAS 2011/A/2425 Ahongalu Fusimalohi v. FIFA, Award of 8 March 2012, para 92 [‘Therefore, the question is whether the Appellant’s conduct was such that it was unambiguously a rejection of the offered bribe and that the offeror (as well as any bystander) would imply and conclude that the attempted corruption failed’].

  205. 205.

    CAS 2011/A/2426 Amos Adamu v. FIFA, Award of 24 February 2012, para 132–133.

  206. 206.

    CAS 2011/A/2425 Ahongalu Fusimalohi v. FIFA, Award of 8 March 2012, para 93.

  207. 207.

    CAS 2011/A/2425 Ahongalu Fusimalohi v. FIFA, Award of 8 March 2012, para 94.

  208. 208.

    Article 27 FCE provides:

    1. Persons bound by this Code shall not accept, give, offer, promise, receive, request or solicit any personal or undue pecuniary or other advantage in order to obtain or retain business or any other improper advantage to or from anyone within or outside FIFA. Such acts are prohibited regardless of whether carried out directly or indirectly through, or in conjunction with, third parties. In particular, persons bound by this Code shall not accept, give, offer, promise, receive, request or solicit any personal or undue pecuniary or other advantage for the execution or omission of an act that is related to their official activities and is contrary to their duties or falls within their discretion.

    2. Persons bound by this Code shall refrain from any activity or behaviour that might give rise to the appearance or suspicion of a breach of this article.

    3. Violation of this article shall be sanctioned with an appropriate fine of at least CHF 100,000 as well as a ban on taking part in any football-related activity for a minimum of five years. Any amount unduly received shall be included in the calculation of the fine. The sanction shall be increased accordingly where the person holds a high position in football, as well as in relation to the relevance and amount of the advantage received.

  209. 209.

    CAS 2019/A/6665 Ricardo Terra Teixeira v. FIFA, Award of 14 September 2021, para 69.

  210. 210.

    Ibid., paras 109–116.

  211. 211.

    Ibid., paras 117–131.

  212. 212.

    Ibid., paras 131–145.

  213. 213.

    CAS 2019/A/6665 Ricardo Terra Teixeira v. FIFA, Award of 14 September 2021, para 131.

  214. 214.

    Ibid., para 148.

  215. 215.

    Ibid., para 149.

  216. 216.

    Ibid., para 150.

  217. 217.

    Ibid.

  218. 218.

    Ibid., para 151.

  219. 219.

    Ibid.

  220. 220.

    Ibid., para 152.

  221. 221.

    Ibid.

  222. 222.

    Ibid., para 153.

  223. 223.

    Ibid.

  224. 224.

    Ibid., para 154.

  225. 225.

    Article 19 FCE provides:

    1. Persons bound by this Code shall not perform their duties (in particular, preparing or participating in the taking of a decision) in situations in which an existing or potential conflict of interest might affect such performance.

    A conflict of interest arises if a person bound by this Code has, or appears to have, secondary interests that could influence his ability to perform his duties with integrity in an independent and purposeful manner. Secondary interests include, but are not limited to, gaining any possible advantage for the persons bound by this Code themselves or related parties as defined in this Code.

    2. Before being elected, appointed or employed, persons bound by this Code shall disclose any relations and interests that could lead to situations of conflicts of interest in the context of their prospective activities.

    3. Persons bound by this Code shall not perform their duties (in particular preparing, or participating in, the taking of a decision) in situations in which there is a danger that a conflict of interest might affect such performance. Any such conflict shall be immediately disclosed and notified to the organisation for which the person bound by this Code performs his duties.

    4. Violation of this article shall be sanctioned with an appropriate fine of at least CHF 10,000 as well as a ban on taking part in any football-related activity for a maximum of two years. In serious cases and/or in the case of repetition, a ban on taking part in any football-related activity may be pronounced for a maximum of five years.

  226. 226.

    CAS 2016/A/4501 Joseph S. Blatter v. FIFA, Award of 5 December 2016, para 298.

  227. 227.

    Ibid., para 299.

  228. 228.

    Ibid.

  229. 229.

    Ibid.

  230. 230.

    TAS 2016/A/4474 Michel Platini c. FIFA, paras 300–302.

  231. 231.

    Ibid., para 303.

  232. 232.

    Ibid., para 304.

  233. 233.

    Ibid., paras 307–308.

  234. 234.

    Ibid., para 310.

  235. 235.

    Ibid.

  236. 236.

    Ibid., para 311.

  237. 237.

    CAS 2017/A/5003 70 Jérôme Valcke v. FIFA, Award of 27 July 2018, para 180.

  238. 238.

    Ibid., para 181.

  239. 239.

    Ibid.

  240. 240.

    Ibid., para 182.

  241. 241.

    Ibid., para 183.

  242. 242.

    Ibid., para 184.

  243. 243.

    Ibid., para 185.

  244. 244.

    Ibid., para 188.

  245. 245.

    Ibid., para 189.

  246. 246.

    Ibid., para 191.

  247. 247.

    Ibid., para 192.

  248. 248.

    CAS 2017/A/5003 70 Jérôme Valcke v. FIFA, Award of 27 July 2018, para 192.

  249. 249.

    Ibid.

  250. 250.

    Ibid., para 223.

  251. 251.

    Ibid., para 224.

  252. 252.

    Ibid., para 225.

  253. 253.

    Ibid., para 226.

  254. 254.

    Ibid.

  255. 255.

    Ibid.

  256. 256.

    CAS 2017/A/5006 Harold Mayne-Nicholls v. FIFA, Award of 14 July 2017, paras 199–200.

  257. 257.

    Ibid., para 199.

  258. 258.

    Ibid.

  259. 259.

    Ibid.

  260. 260.

    Ibid.

  261. 261.

    Ibid.

  262. 262.

    Ibid., para 200.

  263. 263.

    Article 28 FCE provides:

    1. Persons bound by this Code shall not misappropriate or misuse funds of FIFA, the confederations, associations, leagues or clubs, whether directly or indirectly through, or in conjunction with, third parties.

    2. Persons bound by this Code shall refrain from any activity or behaviour that might give rise to the appearance or suspicion of a breach of this article.

    3. Violation of this article shall be sanctioned with an appropriate fine of at least CHF 100,000 as well as a ban on taking part in any football-related activity for a minimum of five years. The amount of misappropriated funds shall be included in the calculation of the fine. The sanction shall be increased accordingly where the person holds a high position in football, as well as in relation to the relevance and amount of the funds concerned or of the advantage received.

  264. 264.

    CAS 2019/A/6326 Chabour Goc Alei v. FIFA, Award of 16 July 2020, paras 196–222.

  265. 265.

    Ibid., paras 200–202.

  266. 266.

    Ibid., para 202.

  267. 267.

    Ibid., para 204.

  268. 268.

    Ibid., paras 205–210.

  269. 269.

    Ibid., paras 211–213.

  270. 270.

    Ibid., para 215.

  271. 271.

    CAS 2016/A/4501 Joseph S. Blatter v. FIFA, Award of 5 December 2016, para 313.

  272. 272.

    Ibid., citing CAS 2009/A/1817 WADA & FIFA v. CFA, C. Marques et al. and CAS 2009/A/1844 FIFA v. CFA & E. Eranosian, Award of 26 October 2010, para 174. For a similar view, see CAS 2017/A/5003 70 Jérôme Valcke v. FIFA, Award of 27 July 2018, para 274, CAS 2017/A/5086 Mong Joon Chung v. FIFA, Award of 9 February 2018, para 206 and CAS 2019/A/6665 Ricardo Terra Teixeira v. FIFA, para 157.

  273. 273.

    CAS 2016/A/4501 Joseph S. Blatter v. FIFA, Award of 5 December 2016, para 314.

  274. 274.

    TAS 2016/A/4474 Michel Platini c. FIFA, para 357, referring to CAS 2013/A/3256 Fenerbahçe Sport Kulübü v. UEFA, Award of 11 April 2014, para 573.

  275. 275.

    CAS 2018/A/6072 Kwesi Nyantakyi v. FIFA, Award of 9 April 2020, para 56.

  276. 276.

    CAS 2011/A/2426 Amos Adamu v. FIFA, Award of 24 February 2012, para 152 and CAS 2011/A/2425 Ahongalu Fusimalohi v. FIFA, Award of 8 March 2012, para 117.

  277. 277.

    Ibid.

  278. 278.

    Ibid.

  279. 279.

    CAS 2019/A/6665 Ricardo Terra Teixeira v. FIFA, para 158.

  280. 280.

    CAS 2014/A/3537 Vernon Manilal Fernando v. FIFA, Award of 30 March 2015, para 104.

  281. 281.

    CAS 2011/A/2426 Amos Adamu v. FIFA, Award of 24 February 2012, para 157; CAS 2016/A/4501 Joseph S. Blatter v. FIFA, Award of 5 December 2016, para 316; TAS 2016/A/4474 Michel Platini c. FIFA, para 359; CAS 2017/A/5086 Mong Joon Chung v. FIFA, Award of 9 February 2018, para 219; CAS 2017/A/5006 Harold Mayne-Nicholls v. FIFA, Award of 14 July 2017, para 213; CAS 2019/A/6665 Ricardo Terra Teixeira v. FIFA, para 158.

  282. 282.

    CAS 2011/A/2426 Amos Adamu v. FIFA, Award of 24 February 2012, para 157. See as well in CAS 2011/A/2425 Ahongalu Fusimalohi v. FIFA, Award of 8 March 2012, para 121 [‘The Appellant’s behaviour is particularly reprehensible given his position as a member of the OFC Executive Committee and of the FIFA Olympic Tournaments Committee, and even as a public figure politically involved at national level. Whilst holding those positions and necessarily being familiar with the FCE, the Appellant could not have ignored the unethical and unlawful nature of the Franklin Jones lobbyists’ approach. In fact, in light of his responsibilities within FIFA and OFC, he had an ethical duty to act responsibly, to comply with ethical standards and to be a role model.’].

  283. 283.

    CAS 2011/A/2426 Amos Adamu v. FIFA, Award of 24 February 2012, para 157.

  284. 284.

    Ibid.

  285. 285.

    CAS 2016/A/4501 Joseph S. Blatter v. FIFA, Award of 5 December 2016, para 316.

  286. 286.

    Ibid.

  287. 287.

    TAS 2016/A/4474 Michel Platini c. FIFA, para 359 [‘En revanche, la Formation considère comme facteurs aggravants le fait que M. Platini a exercé des fonctions très élevées tant à la FIFA qu’à l’UEFA et qu’il avait donc un devoir accru de respecter les règles internes de ces organisations.’].

  288. 288.

    CAS 2017/A/5006 Harold Mayne-Nicholls v. FIFA, Award of 14 July 2017, para 213.

  289. 289.

    Ibid.

  290. 290.

    CAS 2019/A/6665 Ricardo Terra Teixeira v. FIFA, para 158.

  291. 291.

    CAS 2017/A/5006 Harold Mayne-Nicholls v. FIFA, Award of 14 July 2017, para 213.

  292. 292.

    Ibid.

  293. 293.

    Ibid.

  294. 294.

    CAS 2018/A/5769 Worawi Makudi v. FIFA, Award of 11 February 2019, para 146.

  295. 295.

    CAS 2011/A/2426 Amos Adamu v. FIFA, Award of 24 February 2012, para 158 and CAS 2011/A/2425 Ahongalu Fusimalohi v. FIFA, Award of 8 March 2012, para 122.

  296. 296.

    Ibid.

  297. 297.

    CAS 2017/A/5006 Harold Mayne-Nicholls v. FIFA, Award of 14 July 2017, para 213.

  298. 298.

    CAS 2017/A/5086 Mong Joon Chung v. FIFA, Award of 9 February 2018, para 219.

  299. 299.

    CAS 2017/A/5006 Harold Mayne-Nicholls v. FIFA, Award of 14 July 2017, para 213.

  300. 300.

    CAS 2017/A/5086 Mong Joon Chung v. FIFA, Award of 9 February 2018, para 219.

  301. 301.

    TAS 2016/A/4474 Michel Platini c. FIFA, para 358 [‘Comme l’a retenu la Décision entreprise, en l’espèce, les circonstances atténuantes sont le fait que M. Platini n’avait aucun antécédant, qu’il avait rendu des services considérables à la FIFA, à l’UEFA et au football durant de nombreuses années […]’].

  302. 302.

    CAS 2017/A/5006 Harold Mayne-Nicholls v. FIFA, Award of 14 July 2017, para 214.

  303. 303.

    CAS 2018/A/6038 Osiris Guzmán v. FIFA, Award of 23 September 2019, para 130.

  304. 304.

    CAS 2017/A/5086 Mong Joon Chung v. FIFA, Award of 9 February 2018, para 220.

  305. 305.

    CAS 2011/A/2426 Amos Adamu v. FIFA, Award of 24 February 2012, paras 162–163 and CAS 2017/A/5003 Jérôme Valcke v. FIFA, Award of 27 July 2018, para 286.

  306. 306.

    When no regrets are shown, it is expressly mentioned as a sign of the absence of mitigating factors, see CAS 2011/A/2425 Ahongalu Fusimalohi v. FIFA, Award of 8 March 2012, para 126 and TAS 2016/A/4474 Michel Platini c. FIFA, para 358.

  307. 307.

    CAS 2011/A/2426 Amos Adamu v. FIFA, Award of 24 February 2012, para 162.

  308. 308.

    CAS 2018/A/6072 Kwesi Nyantakyi v. FIFA, Award of 9 April 2020, para 73.

  309. 309.

    CAS 2018/A/6072 Kwesi Nyantakyi v. FIFA, Award of 9 April 2020, para 73.

  310. 310.

    CAS 2017/A/5006 Harold Mayne-Nicholls v. FIFA, Award of 14 July 2017, para 214.

  311. 311.

    TAS 2016/A/4474 Michel Platini c. FIFA, para 358.

  312. 312.

    CAS 2017/A/5006 Harold Mayne-Nicholls v. FIFA, Award of 14 July 2017, para 214.

  313. 313.

    CAS 2018/A/5769 Worawi Makudi v. FIFA, Award of 11 February 2019, para 141.

  314. 314.

    CAS 2019/A/6326 Chabour Goc Alei v. FIFA, Award of 16 July 2020, para 250.

  315. 315.

    TAS 2016/A/4474 Michel Platini c. FIFA, para 358.

  316. 316.

    CAS 2018/A/5769 Worawi Makudi v. FIFA, Award of 11 February 2019, para 143.

  317. 317.

    Ibid., para 141.

  318. 318.

    CAS 2019/A/6326 Chabour Goc Alei v. FIFA, Award of 16 July 2020, para 249.

  319. 319.

    CAS 2018/A/6072 Kwesi Nyantakyi v. FIFA, Award of 9 April 2020, para 60.

  320. 320.

    CAS 2017/A/5006 Harold Mayne-Nicholls v. FIFA, Award of 14 July 2017, para 215.

  321. 321.

    CAS 2017/A/5086 Mong Joon Chung v. FIFA, Award of 9 February 2018, para 211.

  322. 322.

    Ibid., paras 213–218.

  323. 323.

    Ibid., para 221.

  324. 324.

    CAS 2018/A/6072 Kwesi Nyantakyi v. FIFA, Award of 9 April 2020, para 66.

  325. 325.

    Ibid.

  326. 326.

    The case was extensively compared to CAS 2011/A/2426 Amos Adamu v. FIFA, Award of 24 February 2012; TAS 2011/A/2433 Amadou Diakite c. FIFA, Award of 8 March 2012; TAS 2016/A/4474 Michel Platini c. FIFA; CAS 2016/A/4501 Joseph S. Blatter v. FIFA, Award of 5 December 2016, and CAS 2017/A/5003 Jérôme Valcke v. FIFA, Award of 27 July 2018, see CAS 2019/A/6326 Chabour Goc Alei v. FIFA, Award of 16 July 2020, paras 229–241.

  327. 327.

    CAS 2017/A/5003 Jérôme Valcke v. FIFA, Award of 27 July 2018, para 287.

  328. 328.

    TAS 2016/A/4474 Michel Platini c. FIFA, para 368.

  329. 329.

    CAS 2019/A/6326 Chabour Goc Alei v. FIFA, Award of 16 July 2020, para 262.

  330. 330.

    CAS 2018/A/6072 Kwesi Nyantakyi v. FIFA, Award of 9 April 2020, para 90.

  331. 331.

    Ibid., para 91.

  332. 332.

    CAS 2017/A/5086 Mong Joon Chung v. FIFA, Award of 9 February 2018, para 224.

  333. 333.

    Ibid.

  334. 334.

    For a more optimistic reading of these developments, see Casini (2021).

  335. 335.

    Paul Nicholson, Bility lays bare FIFA’s ‘weaponized’ and politicised Ethics process in open letter to Council, Inside World Football, 14 June 2022, https://www.insideworldfootball.com/2019/07/31/bility-lays-bare-fifas-weaponized-politicised-ethics-process-open-letter-council/. Accessed 1 July 2022.

  336. 336.

    For example, it remains unclear why investigations against the FIFA President, Gianni Infantino, were discontinued, see Tariq Panja, FIFA President Gianni Infantino Faces New Ethics Complaint, New York Times, 13 September 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/sports/soccer/fifa-gianni-infantino-ethics-complaint.html. Accessed 1 July 2022.

  337. 337.

    For a critical ‘view from the trenches’, see Maduro and Weiler (2021), pp. 129–136.

  338. 338.

    For concrete reform proposals, see Pielke (2014), Pieth (2011).

  339. 339.

    Bean (2017).

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Acknowledgment

I would like to thank my intern Pedro Mercado for the invaluable help in editing this chapter.

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Duval, A. (2022). Football’s Bad Governance in the Dock: The Court of Arbitration for Sport and FIFA’s Policing of Football Officials. In: Duval, A., Rigozzi, A. (eds) Yearbook of International Sports Arbitration 2018–2020. Yearbook of International Sports Arbitration. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/15757_2022_44

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