The Survival of the Weakest in Networks

  • S. Nikoletseas
  • C. Raptopoulos
  • P. Spirakis
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4368)


We study here dynamic antagonism in a fixed network, represented as a graph G of n vertices. In particular, we consider the case of kn particles walking randomly independently around the network. Each particle belongs to exactly one of two antagonistic species, none of which can give birth to children. When two particles meet, they are engaged in a (sometimes mortal) local fight. The outcome of the fight depends on the species to which the particles belong. Our problem is to predict (i.e. to compute) the eventual chances of species survival. We prove here that this can indeed be done in expected polynomial time on the size of the network, provided that the network is undirected.


Polynomial Time Initial Position Directed Graph Undirected Graph Replicator Dynamic 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • S. Nikoletseas
    • 1
    • 2
  • C. Raptopoulos
    • 1
    • 2
  • P. Spirakis
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Computer Technology InstitutePatrasGreece
  2. 2.University of PatrasPatrasGreece

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