Congestion Control in Multi-Agent Systems Through Dynamic Games of Deterrence

  • Michel Rudnianski
  • Hélène Bestougeff
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3825)


Congestion control in MAS is addressed through a network of agents communicating with each other, for issuing and responding to assistance requests. The network state is analyzed as a particular qualitative game, called Game of Deterrence. A congestion avoidance algorithm is proposed, on the basis of the game solutions. The relation between the type of game reflecting the structure of the agent network, and the occurrence of congestion is then analyzed, highlighting the impact of the network size, and leading to the alternative of either implementing the algorithm, or breaking down the global network in regional networks inside which the congestion occurrence probability is low. The method is then extended to the dynamic case through an example showing existence of cycles.


Nash Equilibrium Congestion Control Dynamic Game Game Congestion Congestion Avoidance 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michel Rudnianski
    • 1
  • Hélène Bestougeff
    • 2
  1. 1.University of Reims, ARESADParisFrance
  2. 2.University Paris VII – Denis DiderotFrance

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