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Defining Agents Via Strategies: Towards a View of MAS as Games

  • D. R. Vasconcelos
  • E. H. Haeusler
  • Mario R. F. Benevides
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3825)

Abstract

In this article, we intend to characterize, at least on BDI (Belief-Desire-Intention) basis, a class of games G for which there is a MAS and vice-versa. As a consequence, criteria of rationality for agents can be directly applied to players and vice-versa. Game analysis formal tools can be applied to MAS as well. The main results of this article are the following two lemmata.

Lemma I: Every MAS belonging to G is, essentially, a Game.

Lemma II: Every Game can be implemented as a MAS and Equilibria are Optimal Desires Satisfaction.

Keywords

Game Theory Solution Concept Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Coalition Game Extensive Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • D. R. Vasconcelos
    • 1
  • E. H. Haeusler
    • 1
  • Mario R. F. Benevides
    • 2
  1. 1.Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de JaneiroBrazil
  2. 2.Programa de Sistemas, COPPE/UFRJBrazil

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