Abstract
The systematic protection of critical information infrastructures requires an analytical process to identify the critical components and their interplay, to determine the threats and vulnerabilities, to assess the risks and to prioritise countermeasures where risk is unacceptable. This paper presents an integrated framework for model-based symbolic interpretation, simulation and analysis with a comprehensive approach focussing on the validation of network security policies. A graph of all possible attack paths is automatically computed from the model of an ICT network, of vulnerabilities, exploits and an attacker strategy. Constraints on this graph are given by a model of the network security policy. The impact of changes to security policies can be computed and visualised by finding differences in the attack graphs. A unique feature of the presented approach is, that abstract representations of these graphs can be computed that allow comparison of focussed views on the behaviour of the system. This guides optimal adaptation of the security policy to the given vulnerability setting.
Keywords
- threats analysis
- attack simulation
- critical infrastructure protection
- network security policies
- risk assessment
- security modelling and simulation
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Rieke, R. (2006). Modelling and Analysing Network Security Policies in a Given Vulnerability Setting. In: Lopez, J. (eds) Critical Information Infrastructures Security. CRITIS 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4347. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11962977_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11962977_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-69083-2
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