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Optimal Key-Trees for Tree-Based Private Authentication

  • Levente Buttyán
  • Tamás Holczer
  • István Vajda
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4258)

Abstract

Key-tree based private authentication has been proposed by Molnar and Wagner as a neat way to efficiently solve the problem of privacy preserving authentication based on symmetric key cryptography. However, in the key-tree based approach, the level of privacy provided by the system to its members may decrease considerably if some members are compromised. In this paper, we analyze this problem, and show that careful design of the tree can help to minimize this loss of privacy. First, we introduce a benchmark metric for measuring the resistance of the system to a single compromised member. This metric is based on the well-known concept of anonymity sets. Then, we show how the parameters of the key-tree should be chosen in order to maximize the system’s resistance to single member compromise under some constraints on the authentication delay. In the general case, when any member can be compromised, we give a lower bound on the level of privacy provided by the system. We also present some simulation results that show that this lower bound is quite sharp. The results of this paper can be directly used by system designers to construct optimal key-trees in practice; indeed, we consider this as the main contribution of our work.

Keywords

Springer LNCS Authentication Delay Privacy Enhance Technology Automate Fare Collection Potential Prover 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Levente Buttyán
    • 1
  • Tamás Holczer
    • 1
  • István Vajda
    • 1
  1. 1.Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS), Department of TelecommunicationsBudapest University of Technology and EconomicsHungary

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