Valet Services: Improving Hidden Servers with a Personal Touch

  • Lasse Øverlier
  • Paul Syverson
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4258)


Location hidden services have received increasing attention as a means to resist censorship and protect the identity of service operators. Research and vulnerability analysis to date has mainly focused on how to locate the hidden service. But while the hiding techniques have improved, almost no progress has been made in increasing the resistance against DoS attacks directly or indirectly on hidden services. In this paper we suggest improvements that should be easy to adopt within the existing hidden service design, improvements that will both reduce vulnerability to DoS attacks and add QoS as a service option. In addition we show how to hide not just the location but the existence of the hidden service from everyone but the users knowing its service address. Not even the public directory servers will know how a private hidden service can be contacted, or know it exists.


Validity Period Directory Server Distribute Hash Table Connection Request Anonymous User 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Lasse Øverlier
    • 1
    • 2
  • Paul Syverson
    • 3
  1. 1.Norwegian Defence Research EstablishmentKjellerNorway
  2. 2.Gjøvik University CollegeGjøvikNorway
  3. 3.Naval Research Laboratory Code 5540Center for High Assurance Computer SystemsWashington DCUSA

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