Selectively Traceable Anonymity

  • Luis von Ahn
  • Andrew Bortz
  • Nicholas J. Hopper
  • Kevin O’Neill
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4258)


Anonymous communication can, by its very nature, facilitate socially unacceptable behavior; such abuse of anonymity is a serious impediment to its widespread deployment. This paper studies two notions related to the prevention of abuse. The first is selective traceability, the property that a message’s sender can be traced with the help of an explicitly stated set of parties. The second is noncoercibility, the property that no party can convince an adversary (using technical means) that he was not the sender of a message. We show that, in principal, almost any anonymity scheme can be made selectively traceable, and that a particular anonymity scheme can be modified to be noncoercible.


Random Oracle Protocol Message Shared Channel Anonymous Communication Group Signature Scheme 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Luis von Ahn
    • 1
  • Andrew Bortz
    • 2
  • Nicholas J. Hopper
    • 3
  • Kevin O’Neill
    • 4
  1. 1.Carnegie Mellon UniversityPittsburghUSA
  2. 2.Stanford UniversityPalo AltoUSA
  3. 3.University of MinnesotaMinneapolisUSA
  4. 4.Cornell UniversityIthacaUSA

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